12-1983

The Cresset (Vol. XLVII, No. 2)

Valparaiso University

A REVIEW OF LITERATURE, THE ARTS, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS / DECEMBER, 1983

THE CRESSET

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THE CRESSET *Valparaiso University Valparaiso, Indiana 46383*

ROBERT V. SCHNABEL, *Publisher*
JAMES NUECHTERLEIN, *Editor*

DECEMBER, 1983 Vol. XLVII, No. 2

ISSN 0011-1198

Contributors

THE CRESSET is published monthly during the academic year, September through May, by the Valparaiso University Press as a forum for ideas and informed opinion. The views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of opinion at Valparaiso University. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Letters to the Editor for publication are subject to editing for brevity. The *Book Review Index* and the *American Humanities Index* list Cresset reviews. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Regular subscription rates: one year—$7.50; two years—$13.00; single copy—$1.00. Student subscription rates: one year—$3.50; single copy—$.60.

C. A. Schwerdegeburth (German), *Dr. Martin Luther preaches in the village Möhra* (detail), 1847. Engraving, 6-5/8" x 9-3/8", from a seven engraving "Luther-Bilder" portfolio. Valparaiso University Art Collection. Gift of Selma and Gerhard Neils. VU 80.3.1

Cover: C. A. Schwerdegeburth (German), *Dr. Martin Luther in the circle of his family in Wittenberg on Christmas Eve 1536* (detail), 1843. Engraving, 6-5/8" x 9-3/8", from a seven engraving "Luther-Bilder" portfolio. Valparaiso University Art Collection. Gift of Selma and Gerhard Neils. VU 80.3.5
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Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

The Intervention in Grenada

The intervention in Grenada has turned out so well that perhaps the strongest point to be made against it is that it could occasion excessive pride and self-confidence among those who brought it off. We can imagine —though we hope otherwise—that in the aftermath of Grenada some people in the national security apparatus might be tempted to the suggestion, "Why not Nicaragua?" That cautionary surmise aside, however, we can think of no persuasive reason for withholding support from the government's Grenadian policy.

This is not, of course, a judgment that all reasonable people acquiesce in. Critics of the intervention argue variously that it was not necessary, that it violated basic principles of international behavior, that its costs outweighed its benefits, and that it represented a dangerous and unthinking militarization of American foreign policy. Those are not frivolous objections, but the more closely one examines them the less telling they appear.

Opponents of the intervention argue, in the first instance, that the Reagan Administration's expressed concern for the safety of the American students on the island should be treated skeptically. There is no evidence, they insist, that the students were ever in danger; indeed, they point out, Grenadian officials had attempted to offer assurances that the students would not be harmed. In any case, the argument concludes, even if the U.S. thought it necessary to evacuate the students, that action would not have required the full invasion and occupation of the island.

Defenders of the Administration would certainly have a difficult time establishing that protection of American lives was the *only* purpose of the intervention. The government clearly had additional ends in mind. But that is not to say that the Administration's expressions of concern over the students' safety were hypocritical or that the students were not in fact in danger. There is no way of knowing what would have happened to the students had America not intervened. Perhaps nothing. But a great many of them thought they were in danger, as did most of the members of the bipartisan Congressional committee who later went to Grenada to investigate the matter. Neither the students nor the Democratic members of the Congressional committee had any reason to conjure up dangers that did not exist. Given the state of chaos and violence that prevailed in Grenada and given as well the vivid memories of the Iranian hostage fiasco, it is difficult to see the Administration's concern for the students' safety as anything other than prudent and responsible.

The question of the students' safety aside, opposition to the Grenadian venture has focused primarily on the presumed American violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. America had no right, the argument goes, to presume to determine how or by whom Grenada should be governed. If Americans object to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, critics ask, by what logic do they justify their own intervention in Grenada?

This is one of those cases where abstract moral principle can become the enemy of moral clarity. In the first place, virtually no one holds to an absolute doctrine of non-intervention. Was it wrong to intervene in Idi Amin's Uganda? Would those who become morally exercised over American actions in Grenada object to attempts by outside powers to undermine the government of South Africa? We know the answers to those questions, even as we know, or ought to know, how absurd it is to compare Grenada with Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is brutally imposing its will on a nation whose people manifestly oppose Russian control. If the Russians manage to overcome the Afghani resistance, as in time they presumably will, the government they install and maintain will be, by all precedent, an oppressive dictatorship. Nowhere has the imposition of Soviet influence meant anything else.

Compare Grenada. Before the American intervention, the Marxist government led by Maurice Bishop, which had itself come to power through a coup, had been overthrown by a group led by Bernard Coard that apparently found Bishop's regime insufficiently radical. Bishop and many other members of his government were murdered. Coard's group presided over a situation of violent uncertainty. A number of Grenada's neighboring islands, banded together as the Organization of East Caribbean States, invited the United States to intervene.

When U.S. forces did so—and this point cannot be stressed too strongly—they were greeted as liberators by an overwhelming majority of the Grenadian people. The U.S. has subsequently promised to leave as soon as possible and assurances have been given that free elections will be conducted as quickly as conditions permit. All of which means that American intervention will have resulted not in the imposition of alien domination but in genuine self-determination for the Grenadian people. American has not thwarted democracy in Grenada; it has made it possible.

By what kind of demented evenhandedness then (to

recall again Peter Berger's apposite phrase) do critics equate Grenada with Afghanistan? How can they, with fine olympian impartiality, talk and act as if there were no moral distinctions to be made between the expansion of American interests and the expansion of Soviet interests? Intellectual sophisticates may understandably have wearied of cold war rhetoric, but it is an act of moral abnegation for them to behave as if no preference need be indicated between the values of the western democratic tradition and those of Marxism-Leninism. We need harbor no illusions of our own virtue to be realists about the evil of the Communist system. Right-wing extremists often make exaggerated claims concerning a loss of will in the liberal West, but when one encounters as often as one does the kind of moral confusion that cannot tell the difference between Afghanistan and Grenada, one begins to wonder if they do not have a point.

Nonetheless, it is said, we must pay heed to international pieties, however mindless we may find them to be. The principle of non-intervention has been elevated into an absolute standard, as was indicated by the overwhelming vote in the United Nations General Assembly deploring American intervention in Grenada. (It is depressing but not surprising that the vote against America was more decisive than the U.N.'s earlier vote criticizing the Soviets over Afghanistan.) Even America's European allies, who presumably ought to know better, were anything but enthusiastic over the Grenadian intervention. Critics therefore argue that whatever the intrinsic merits of the Grenadian operation, it must be counted as a blunder because of its cost to America's international reputation.

Certainly America owes a decent respect to the views of other nations, but what responsible leader will allow his foreign policy to be determined by the vagaries and structural cowardices of world opinion? To make decisions according to the vector of forces of international opinion is to commit oneself to a policy of perpetual inactivity. America's allies fluctuate between general urgings that we display steadiness of will and specific pleadings that we never in any particular situation do anything to upset anyone. But there is more to foreign policy than avoiding the untoward.

Which brings us to the question of whether Grenada represents a dangerous militarization of American foreign policy. It is possible to acknowledge that as a genuine concern, but it is difficult to see that we need at present be alarmed. Except to those of a pacifist persuasion, power is a necessary and enduring element in international relations, and it encompasses, on occasion, the use of military force. America is not Switzerland. Our international responsibilities require of us the measured use of force in the pursuit and defense of values for which history has made us trustee. If we exercise that power recklessly, the world will come to hate and fear us, but if we refrain from using it where appropriate, the world will hold us in polite contempt.

Debating abstractions concerning the use of power will get us nowhere. We need to focus on particular cases. In Grenada, we used limited force in such a manner and in such a cause that the great majority of people on the spot applauded our actions. It is odd, to say the least, that the opinion of those directly affected should be taken to count for less than that of critics with no direct stake in the outcome. Consider just for a moment how radically our attitudes toward Afghanistan would change if we had reason to believe that the people there welcomed the Soviet invaders.

There is no point in generalizing from the Grenadian success or in making more of it than is called for. What made sense there would not necessarily do so in El Salvador or Nicaragua. But Grenada did perhaps send certain useful signals. The Russians, Cubans, and North Koreans, all of whom had established arms and training agreements with the former Grenadian government, may have learned that military meddling in America's back yard carries risks for all concerned. If our action in Grenada in any way inhibited the growth of Marxism-Leninism elsewhere in the hemisphere, then it served a useful purpose. Force is not a substitute for diplomacy, but it is at times a useful extension of it. So it was in Grenada.

Finally, a tangential but important issue. The intervention in Grenada took place under a press black-out. The media not only missed the first landings; they had to wait for at least two full days afterward to gain access to the island. That was a mistake. We appreciate fully the need for secrecy in military planning, and we can understand the desire of military leaders to carry on their affairs free from the second-guessing of the press. But press coverage, even when trivial, unbalanced, or unfair, is part of the price of operating within a democracy. It can legitimately be restricted only for reasons of military necessity. What happened in Grenada went well beyond that, and it should not happen again.

That said, we would urge the press to consider carefully why on this issue the public has shown it so little sympathy. The reason is obvious: the elite press has placed itself in such an adversarial relationship to the government that many Americans have come to see members of the press not as bearers of truth but as instinctive and habitual opponents of those the people have placed in power. A press that paid more attention to gathering the news and less to acting as part of the political opposition might find itself receiving more trust and support from the people it claims to serve.

Building New Jerusalem

Recent Church Statements on War and Peace

Steven Schroeder

The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, approved by U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops at a special meeting in Chicago during the first week of May, has been widely acclaimed as the most comprehensive statement on nuclear policy formulated to date by the Church. Much of the reaction has taken the form of summary and/or comparison of the final draft of the document to earlier versions. It is important to summarize this complex document, and it is instructive to chronicle the development of the Bishops' arguments. But, if we are to take the document seriously and accept the Bishops' invitation to a "public moral dialogue," it is appropriate to move beyond the bounds of the document itself by reading it along with other recent statements on war and peace issued by various Protestant denominations and ecumenical bodies. It is neither necessary nor possible to undertake a comprehensive survey here; but several statements issued since October 1981 help illuminate important issues and broaden the analysis undertaken by the Bishops in Chicago. If nothing else, this exercise should clarify common ground in diverse approaches to the complex issues involved and point the way for further dialogue.

In October 1981, the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church in the United States issued a pastoral letter entitled "Apocalypse and Hope" in which they called on Christians to "confront the problems revealed by the intense light of any apocalyptic moment" with a "resurrection faith" that rises from Christ's "historic death at the center of history." The Episcopal Bishops pointed to growing tension and heightening anxiety in the face of a constantly escalating arms race, then took this situation as an occasion for proposing a broad response to crises that confront Christians and others every day.

"Apocalypse and Hope" begins with a faith that rises from Christ's death at the center of history and sets as its task the redefinition of history in terms of God's act in Christ. Apocalyptic moments—or end times—are to be the occasions for redefining history. In this particular moment of apocalypse, precipitated by the increasingly threatening specter of nuclear war, the Bishops are led to the conclusions that "reason forbids the use of violence, or the threat of it, as a means of securing one society against another" and that "the adequacy of spontaneous, private caring for the poor" has been outgrown. In the course of moving toward those conclusions, the Bishops redefine "security" by shifting their focus from the nation to the totality of the human family: "The only security available to any nation is the security of all the nations together." They recognize that to shift to another means of security is "an agony of growth," but they also recognize an obligation to make this "moral shift."

That image of moral development in shifting from an outmoded concept of security to one that is more adequate and more inclusive is an image of the practical task involved in the redefinition of history.

The Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church, in an April 1982 pastoral letter, shared the sense of urgency and crisis evidenced in "Apocalypse and Hope." One issue, they tell us, transcends all others: that of human survival. Confronted with a growing threat to survival, the Methodist Bishops return to the theme of the "oneness of creation," which "moves as a demanding strand through Holy Scripture." The oneness of creation is "a demanding theme"; human survival is "a transcendent issue"; the task, according to the Methodist Bishops, is to bring the theme to bear on the issue. In our present moment of crisis, they see the threat of nuclear destruction as a challenge qualitatively different from any other, and they see eventual nuclear disarmament as necessary for human survival.

The emphasis of the Methodist pastoral is on the threat of destruction. The oneness of creation is cited as a central theme, but the themes that dominate are the threat of nuclear destruction and the imperative of human survival. It is not clear what makes human survival "transcendent" or where the "imperative" of survival is grounded. What *is* clear is that we confront a crisis (labelled "apocalypse" by the Episcopal Bishops) and that we confront it with a vision of "the oneness of creation."

That theme may serve as a broader version of the "historic death at the center of history"; the oneness of creation, in theological terms, flows from the creative

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Steven Schroeder *is Director of Northwest Texas Clergy and Laity Concerned. His article, "Life as Gift and Task: Critical Reflections on the Nuclear Dilemma," appeared in* The Cresset *last January.*

The 1982 statement of the Lutheran Church in America attempts to offer an ethical framework that is distinctively Lutheran. In this respect, it closely parallels the Roman Catholic Bishops' statement.

act and is sustained in the act of reconciliation.

At about the same time as the Methodist pastoral, the council of presidents of the American Lutheran Church issued "A Pastoral Call to Peacemaking." Again, the call is precipitated by recognition of a crisis. The Lutheran Bishops note increasing anxiety among the people of their churches as well as the anxiety they experience themselves. They see this as an "insecurity" that challenges our faith. In one sense, this is the other side of the call issued by both the Episcopal and Methodist Bishops. They see a crisis and call on their churches to challenge it; the Lutheran Bishops point out that the crisis challenges us, whether or not we choose to respond.

The Lutheran pastoral begins with the affirmation that "the earth is the Lord's" and the reminder that "the world and its people have been redeemed at a very high price." Again, we are reminded of both creation and reconciliation as central themes in our vision of the world. The Lutheran Bishops move from affirmation to a recognition of a common calling and its implications: "Our common calling as agents of reconciliation compels us to work from a faith perspective." This recalls the obligation recognized in "Apocalypse and Hope" and challenges us to look at the present with eyes of faith. We bring a unique perspective to the crisis that grows directly out of our call to be "agents of reconciliation." We acknowledge God's sovereignty in Christ; we confess our individual and corporate sins; we raise critical questions regarding issues that confront us; and we recognize peacemaking as a dynamic pursuit of justice.

For the Lutheran Bishops, what is most crucial is the translation of our affirmation of God as creator and redeemer into responsible action. Because we affirm God as creator and redeemer, we act as faithful stewards of creation and as agents of reconciliation in a broken world.

The ALC Bishops' pastoral was expanded and affirmed by the Church's general convention in September 1982 with adoption of a "Mandate for Peacemaking." The Mandate begins with the Gospel proclamation of reconciliation and with confidence in God's redemptive activity. It moves to an affirmation of the inclusiveness of God's Kingdom and a recognition of the Church as a sign of reconciliation. This is a collective version of the vocation emphasized in the Bishops' pastoral: the Church is called to embody God's act of reconciliation in a broken world. The Mandate emphasizes that we confess our failures but take our role seriously, affirming the immorality of nuclear war and specifying policy, personal, and institutional implications of that affirmation. Among the most important implications are insistence on *elimination* of nuclear weapons as the goal of U.S. policy; a call for production of liturgical, devotional, and educational materials on peacemaking; an insistence that pastoral concern be exercised where individuals are struggling with these issues, regardless of agreement or disagreement; and a church-wide emphasis on the Mandate for at least the next five years.

The ALC document, in its call for "a mass movement of social change," echoes a call that is emerging with increasing insistence from churches around the world.

Another Lutheran body, the Lutheran Church in America, prepared a statement in 1982 that is one of the most extensive to date. The statement, "Peace and War: Some Theological and Political Perspectives," does not arrive at definitive answers, but it does attempt to offer an ethical framework that is distinctively Lutheran. In this respect, it most nearly parallels the Roman Catholic Bishops' statement.

The document begins with revelation—in Christ, in Scripture, and in the Church. It moves to a call to study Scripture in the fellowship of the Church and to examine present reality with an informed conscience. For the LCA writers, this means that our concern with war and peace is "the love of Christ extending itself," that we must repent and "recover our theology of the cross," and that we must act out of faith, not guilt or despair.

It is important to note that the bases for our actions and the starting point for our inquiry are central to all of these documents. There is unanimity on the point that we must act in faith and hope rather than in despair.

The LCA document offers several alternative explanations for our predicament and suggests that, regardless of which is espoused, five "underlying dynamics" can be identified: *first,* lack of trust between adversaries in arms races; *second,* misperceptions on all sides that feed the spiral; *third,* political methods for controlling conflict that have not kept pace with technical modes of warfare; *fourth,* destabilizing effects of new technologies that are recognized only in retrospect; and *fifth,* relations between individual behavior and systemic global problems that, because they are not self-evident, breed frustration and a sense of impotence.

It defines war as "violent conflict between parties in which one attempts to force the other to conform to its will" and peace as "harmony between parties." "Temporal peace," according to the LCA document, is "the fruit of justice," while "eternal peace" is "the gift of faith."

Three traditions on war and peace are explored in some detail: pacifism, just war, and the Crusade.

According to the LCA writers, a kind of pacifism prevailed in the early church which was "never thought out." It represented "the practical stance of a persecuted Church." The pacifism of the Radical Reformation, on the other hand, was a confessional position. Adherence to this position was seen as an article of faith. The paci-

The LCA document emphasizes that we must resist the popular notion that we have opened a Pandora's box and are innocent victims of a technology that has taken on a life of its own.

fism of Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, and the Quakers is seen as "a strategy in the service of a political goal." The cumulative effect of these characterizations is to dismiss the idea that pacifism is a *necessary* part of the Christian faith (the position of the Radical Reformation) and admit the idea that pacifism may be an *appropriate* political strategy, especially for a persecuted Church.

Just-war theory is described as a Roman doctrine deriving from Cicero designed to minimize the possibility of rebellion, legitimate the action of the Roman government, and preserve the *status quo.* With its adoption by St. Ambrose, the issue became who defines "just." That issue, of course, continued to be central in the applications of the doctrine by Augustine and Aquinas. The LCA writers point out that Luther's attitude toward war and peace was not based on the just-war approach but on what they refer to as the "One God's Two Rules" (more commonly, though perhaps less accurately, referred to as the Two Kingdoms doctrine). They conclude that the doctrine of just war is neither right nor wrong, but useless.

The third tradition on war and peace, that of the Crusade, is dismissed as a "gross aberration," the "epitome of triumphalistic Christendom." The LCA writers note that, in Old Testament thought, Holy War was seen as God's war with Israel's participation. The Crusade, on the other hand, was war on God's behalf. The Crusade is idolatrous by nature, because it is based on despair of God's power and a seizing of that power in an attempt to rescue or protect it. The LCA writers are quick to note the relation between just-war theory and the Crusade. The theory served to justify the "gross aberration" of Christian triumphalism. This is one reason why just-war theory was useless even before the nuclear age.

The LCA writers draw on Luther to offer a fourth alternative, that of the "One God's Two Rules." In our present situation, this is embodied in the fact that "our hope is that Christ, not Moscow or Washington, is sovereign." The idea is not to separate this world from another or to render "temporal" actions irrelevant in "eternal" terms: it is to emphasize God's sovereignty in both temporal and eternal affairs. "Where we see powers authorizing themselves [i.e., becoming absolute] we are authorized to make them temporal again."

The LCA document emphasizes that we must resist the popular notion that we have opened a Pandora's box and are innocent victims of a technology that has taken on a life of its own. "We have bought our prosperity with these armaments. . . ." We must repent. It also emphasizes that we must rediscover our theology of the cross: God esteems us in Christ on account of God's own act. Finally, it emphasizes that we must act not out of guilt or drivenness or despair, but out of faith. The Church is always recalled as a basis for peacemaking, as a community that underlies and sustains our action.

"The Christian faith," we are told, "does not offer a solution to the problem of power; it authorizes the godly use of power." The only norm is the "law of faith."

An important European perspective on the issue is offered in a statement of the Federation of Reformed Churches in the Federal Republic of Germany, "The Confession of Jesus Christ and the Church's Responsibility for Peace," issued in June 1982. This statement begins with the assertion that "the nuclear preparation for universal holocaust is no 'adiaphoron' [something that is morally neutral]; it is done in contradiction to the basic articles of the Christian creed." This, of course, places the document very close to the approach of the Radical Reformation dismissed by the LCA writers.

Christ's peace, the Reformed writers tell us, liberates us and obligates us to work for peace among all people; "one's position on the means of mass destruction has to do with confession or denial of the gospel." In Christ, God has given peace to all people; this recognition is the order we should affirm. Weapons of mass destruction deny it. God creates and preserves the world; construction of weapons of mass destruction opposes this creation and preservation. In Christ, God connects peace and justice; this is incompatible with a "security" system built and sustained on the backs of the poor. Christ is Lord; this limits the power of the state. Hope in Christ is incompatible with hopelessness and passivity in the face of the threat. God's promise of reconciliation is incompatible with aimless activism, all blasphemous speculations about the "end-times," and all political indifference to issues of peace and justice.

The Reformed document obviously shares some important themes with other Church documents already cited. Our action is based on the revelation and the action of God in Christ; God's sovereignty limits the sovereignty of temporal powers; our action must be on the basis of faith and hope, not despair. One question that the statement raises, especially when it is read with the Lutheran statements just discussed, is how we talk about articles of faith and the implications of how we talk. No one disputes the centrality and importance of the issue; there is, however, some strong objection to classifying it as an article of faith.

Another important perspective is the message of the Christian World Conference on Life and Peace which was prepared in Uppsala, Sweden in April 1983. Although this document came from Europe, it would not be strictly accurate to call it a European perspective. The conference that produced it included 150 church leaders from 62 countries. This gives it an ecumenical

The Uppsala document concludes that "Christian people not only want peace, they are required to make peace. That means that for the churches there is no escape from political involvement."

breadth that is unique in the documents being considered here. It represents a real attempt to give voice to the emerging consensus evidenced in statements like those already discussed. At the same time, it sheds light on some of the sticking points.

The Uppsala document begins with an acknowledgment of differences and unanimously declares that "life in abundance, and the peace which is the fruit of justice, are gifts God offers through Christ to all humankind." Institutionalized violence, we are told, holds the world in bondage. We proclaim a gospel of peace in a world of violence.

Nuclear weapons signal "a new age of terror." Their production and the threat to use them "demonstrates an ultimate arrogance before God who alone disposes of life and death." The problem, again, is one of faith; the issue is that of idolatry.

As in "Apocalypse and Hope," this time is referred to as a "crucial juncture." As in the pastoral letter of the Methodist Bishops, we are reminded that the gospel, in addition to being a message of life, peace, hope, and love, is a message of judgment. We are called to bring that message to bear on the present situation, and we are reminded that God brings it to bear whether we do or not: "God judges the present world order which causes and sustains extensive misery and produces an increasing sense of insecurity."

We are not led to believe that nuclear weapons are merely a threat. This document clearly focuses on present reality: "millions die, not only in military conflicts, but because they are denied the basic necessities of life." But equally real is the existence of the unity of the Church as a sign over against the division of the world. Our nuclear madness is a future threat and a present reality; the hope of salvation is a future promise and a present sign.

"The Scriptures," we are reminded, "teach that peace and justice are inseparably linked." To work for peace is to work for justice, for economic systems which "both care for and equitably distribute the earth's resources" and for political systems within which all can participate "in regaining, preserving and enhancing of their rights and dignity as beings created in the image of God." We are to pay as much attention to North/South as to East/West tensions.

This document articulates the unanimous point, the consensus among church members and church leaders that is becoming increasingly clear, that "nuclear warfare . . . can never be justified." Nuclear warfare is condemned; this raises the question of its threat: "The current military and political doctrine of nuclear deterrence must be challenged." This document is able to go so far as to say that "*most* of us believe that . . . reliance upon the threat and possible use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable as a way of avoiding war." The consensus against waging nuclear war is not yet a consensus against threatening to wage it. *Some* "are willing to tolerate nuclear deterrence . . . as a temporary measure in the absence of alternatives."

The question of deterrence is critical. It again raises questions about how we articulate our faith and the implications of that articulation. "Nuclear deterrence," the Uppsala document tells us, "is essentially dehumanizing, it increases fear and hatred, and entrenches confrontation." Most of those who signed the document agreed that "the existence of these weapons contradicts the will of God"; all agreed that God's will "demands a resolute effort within a specified time limit for their total elimination."

Like "Apocalypse and Hope," the Uppsala document redefines security as common security. That move toward a more inclusive definition of security parallels the unanimous rejection of nuclear war as a morally defensible option.

The Uppsala document concludes that "Christian people not only want peace, they are required to make peace. That means that for the churches there is no escape from political involvement. . . ." Christ's peace obligates us to work for peace among all people.

It should be clear by now that *The Challenge of Peace* stands in a context of carefully articulated reflection on contemporary issues of war and peace that has come from a broad range of church bodies and a number of theological traditions. Especially in the Uppsala document, we see the beginnings of a synthesis that is truly catholic and ecumenical. *The Challenge of Peace* should be read not so much as a synthesis or culmination of theological reflection but as a contribution to a lively theological discussion. That, of course, is precisely what the Bishops said when they adopted it.

Underlying the whole document is Vatican II's call "to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of war." In a sense, that call underlies the broader discussion as well. There has been a growing consciousness across denominational lines and theological traditions of a need to redefine history and to reassess our approach to crises and conflicts.

The Roman Catholic Bishops recognize, like other Church leaders, that the human race faces a moment of crisis. The human race is seen as advancing toward maturity, and the nuclear threat is viewed in the context of that advance. Growing fear and apprehension about nuclear war is evidence that the world is in a moment of crisis, but the letter is written out of hope: "Ultimately our hope rests in the God who gave us life, sustains the world by his power and has called us to revere the lives of every person and all peoples."

For the Roman Catholic Bishops, this moment of

It appears that the Catholic Bishops require agreement on moral principles but allow diversity in interpretation of contemporary situations and in application of principles to those situations.

crisis blends fear and hope into a realization of responsibility given voice by John Paul II at Hiroshima: "From now on it is only through a conscious choice and through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive." This pastoral letter is intended as "an invitation" and "a challenge" to Roman Catholics in the U.S., but it is also "a contribution to a wider common effort meant to call Catholics and all members of our political community to dialogue and specific decisions about this awesome question."

In general, the approach espoused by the Bishops is one of taking universal moral principles and applying them to specific contemporary issues. They look for "prudential judgments . . . based on specific circumstances." They expect "a certain diversity of views even though all hold the same universal moral principles." It would appear that the Bishops require agreement on moral principles but allow diversity in interpretation of contemporary situations and in application of principles to those situations.

That general approach is followed by a seemingly innocuous statement that may well be the most significant insight of the whole document: "Not only conviction and commitment are needed in the church, but also civility and charity." All four of those elements—conviction, commitment, civility, and charity—need to be adequately developed.

At the center of this document lie two principles: "the transcendence of God" and "the dignity of the human person." Like all Catholic teaching on war and peace, the document has two purposes: "to help Catholics form their consciences" and "to contribute to the public policy debate about the morality of war."

According to the Bishops' own outline of the document, it consists of a sketch of the Biblical conception of peace, a theological understanding of how peace can be pursued in a world marked by sin, a moral assessment of key issues, and an assessment of political and personal tasks.

In looking at the Biblical conception of peace, the Bishops remind us that peace is understood in different ways in different contexts and that the Bible reflects a wide variety of historical situations. Regardless of context, however, peace and war must always be seen in the light of God's intervention and our response. In the Old Testament, peace is seen as a gift, the "fruit of God's saving activity." It is a restoration of "right order . . . within all of creation," and it is always understood in terms of fidelity to the covenant. In the New Testament, the actions of Jesus are a sign of God's action in the world; following Jesus implies "continual conversion." Because we have been "gifted with God's peace in the risen Christ, we are called to our own peace and to the making of peace in our world."

This recalls the distinction made earlier in the LCA document between the eternal peace which is God's free gift and the temporal peace which is the fruit of justice. We are given peace in the risen Christ, but at the same time we are called to do justice because of that gift. Obviously, both forms of peace depend on God's action and are God's gift; but "Christians are called to live the tension between the vision of the reign of God and its concrete realization in history."

We proclaim a gospel of peace in a world of violence, because "peace is both a gift of God and a human work."

According to the Roman Catholic Bishops, "the issue of war and peace confronts everyone with a basic question: What contributes to and what impedes the construction of a more genuinely human world?" What we are about is the construction of a more genuinely human world. This is why, as the Uppsala document points out, the issue before us is as much a North/South as an East/West question.

The Church's teaching, we are told, "establishes a strong presumption against war," then "examines when the presumption may be overriden. . . ." The Roman Catholic Bishops join the consensus against nuclear war, but they also join the debate about the threat of nuclear war. We face a paradox, the Bishops tell us: "we must continue to articulate our belief that love is possible and the only real hope for all human relations, and yet accept that force, even deadly force, is sometimes justified and that nations must provide for their defense." Three presumptions bind all Christians in approaching this issue: "We should do no harm to our neighbors; how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbor; and the possibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and trembling."

According to the Roman Catholic Bishops, it is examination of when the presumption against war may be overriden that gives rise to just-war theory, which considers not only when resort to force is justifiable but also how resort to force may be conducted. "Faced with the fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption that we do no harm even to our enemy yields to the command of love understood as the need to restrain an enemy who would injure the innocent."

The question of "when" is answered in the form of *jus ad bellum* criteria: there must be a just cause; decision must be made by a competent authority; decision must be made on the basis of comparative justice ("no state should act on the basis that it has 'absolute justice' on its side"); there must be right intention; it must be a last resort; there must be some probability of success; and the harm done must be proportional to the benefit expected. The question of "how" is answered in the form of *jus in bello* criteria: the harm done must be propor-

Just war theory is neither right nor wrong but useless. One has to suspect that it retrospectively justifies a decision rather than providing a basis on which the decision can initially be made.

tional to the benefit expected, and there must be discrimination between combatants and noncombatants.

The Roman Catholic Bishops are able to use those criteria as the basis for joining the consensus against nuclear war. This is, incidentally, the same basis used by most of the other church bodies that join the consensus. But the criteria do not serve as a basis for consensus against the *threat* of nuclear war and the arms race it is built on. This recalls the contention of the LCA writers that just-war theory is neither right nor wrong but useless. One has to suspect that it retrospectively justifies a decision rather than providing a basis on which the decision can be made.

The Bishops decide on "a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence" as "a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament." This, of course, is where the consensus *almost* reached by the Uppsala Conference breaks down. The Roman Catholic Bishops call what we have now "peace of a sort." This, along with the difficulty, shared by all of the documents cited, in rejecting the threat as well as the act of nuclear war clarifies the critical question of deterrence. The fundamental question is whether we are now dealing with a threat of war or an act of war.

The arms race, the Roman Catholic Bishops tell us, is "an act of aggression against the poor." All the documents cited agree that the threat of nuclear war is raising anxiety and fear to an unprecedented level throughout the human family (a point substantiated by psychological literature). What is this fear and anxiety if not evidence of a pervasive and destructive psychological warfare? We are already dealing with an act of aggression; we must decide how to deal with the aggressor.

The Roman Catholic Bishops end with St. John's vision of a "New Jerusalem." If that vision is to be more than a pious dream, the Church will have to be more serious and consistent about its commitment to "civility." What we are about is building the New Jerusalem and learning to live in it.

That ending is the best criticism of the general approach of the Bishops' pastoral and the best starting point for building beyond it. The Bishops look for general principles to apply in specific situations; this may be connected theologically with a transcendent God as starting point. I suggest that what we have is an incarnate God, an immanent God, and principles that have meaning only in specific situations. We have concrete situations, not abstract principles; and what binds the situations together is not a transcendent God standing apart from them, but a living vision, a God who dwells with humankind, a God who makes things new.

It is not an accident that the vision is the heavenly city, because in understanding any issue (not just peace and war) the key is seeing it in terms of God's intervention and our response. More to the point, it is our response to the issue, to one another, to our world—issues, "others," and worlds in which we affirm God's presence as a given—that matters. It is that response, that way of being in the world, that needs to be shaped and nurtured. We don't need abstract principles about which to argue or agree; we need ways of being in the world that make it a more human place, ways that embody God's presence and re-present the love of Christ "extending itself."

Forming a conscience and building character—both of which are time-honored aspects of Roman Catholic moral thought—have less to do with abstract or general principles than with style or vision. We are educating ourselves and our children in the art of seeing the world with the eyes of faith.

That art is the most unique—and the most useful—gift we as Christians can bring to the public policy debate on nuclear weapons issues.

A Gift from the Wilds Denied

In my dream I learn to love
the touch of his resiny fur,
rough
against my fingertips,
the smell of trees and dried leaves
seasoned
to a wild pungency.

In my dream I ease to the feel
of this woodland creature
seeking safety on my lap.
I breathe
to the rhythms of his breath,
and wonder
at his tender heart,
his soulful trust.

Then in my dream I am seized:
fear of the beast overtakes me.
I drive at night to wood's edge
and leave him there.
Dismay
stares from his soft, wild eyes.
In the silence of his shocked farewell,
he names my fear betrayal.

And in my dream I weep.

Ruth El Saffar

The Free Christian College

Donald G. Luck

The intersection of the Church and the Academy reaches back to some of the earliest periods of Christian history. The establishment of a Christian (albeit Gnostic) Academy in the intellectual center of Alexandria by Basilides in the early second century and St. Augustine's goal in the fourth century of creating a monastic community dedicated equally to intellectual reflection and prayer are interesting examples. In the case of the former, one finds a tangible expression of interest within the Church to move into the arena of the Academy and meet it on its own grounds. In the case of the latter, one finds a concern to bring the work of the Academy into the life of the Church itself. So too Charlemagne's establishment of a system of schools under the direction of the Benedictine order and Melanchthon's efforts in creating the public educational system of Germany concretely express the Church's interest in sponsoring secular education.

A uniquely American realization of this intersection is the emergence of church-related colleges and universities. The removal of the Church from state sponsorship and the wide reaches of immigration resulted in a religious pluralism in America. The Church came to be understood in the paradigmatically American form of "denominations." As these denominations had to find their way amidst the challenges and plurality of American culture, they found it advantageous to establish colleges and universities.

The reasons for these schools are as diverse as their sponsoring denominations. One conscious aim was to provide newly immigrant peoples with occupational and civic skills, thereby assisting assimilation into the wider culture. Founding colleges was one way denominations helped their members join the American mainstream. A rather different aim was the concern to rescue the special identity of these immigrants from the process of assimilation.[1] Often national or ethnic identity was closely aligned with denominational identity; concern to preserve the one usually entailed concern to preserve the other. Institutions of higher education assisted the process. A third reason was that of providing an educated leadership for the sponsoring denomination. It was thought that the continuing denominational participation and loyalty of this leadership could best be preserved by linking education with church sponsorship. A somewhat different aim was the interest of the sponsoring denomination in providing civil leadership in the wider secular community. It was thought that church-educated persons were a means through which that denomination could have a dominant role in shaping American society. A final reason, which surfaced only occasionally but which proved significant, was the use of their colleges by certain denominations as instruments of mission, making them advocates for social criticism and reform.

In short, religious pluralism in America—the presence of different and sometimes competing churches, and their equally different and sometimes conflicting understandings of the relation between church and culture—has given rise to church-sponsored institutions of higher education founded for a variety of purposes. These purposes reflect the special social and theological forces within the sponsoring denominations.

But these special origins place a special burden of interpretation on these institutions. The vigorous presence of public and non-sectarian schools has challenged these church-sponsored institutions to explain themselves. The differing character and aims of supporting denominations has made their schools self-conscious about their identities. And debate within churches about continuing support of colleges and universities has drawn these institutions into the discussions. The upshot of all this has been to make these colleges and universities ask what their historical church relation means in the present.

In 1973, a centennial study commission at St. Olaf College published a report which faced the question of that institution's identity. Interestingly, the report argued that all institutions have four identities. The first is a "constitutive" identity which reflects its charter and special features. The second is its "contingent" identity which expresses what in fact the institution has become but which it need not have become. Third is its "empirical" identity which describes the current character of the institution, including the changes and trends taking place. But finally, and importantly, is its

Donald G. Luck *is Associate Professor of Systematic Theology at Trinity Lutheran Seminary in Columbus, Ohio. He earned his B.A. at Gettysburg College, his B.D. at Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia, and his S.T.M. and Ph.D. at Union Theological Seminary in New York.*

[1] See Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: MacMillan, 1973) and his briefer analysis, "The One and the Many," *Daedalus* (Fall, 1974), pp. 203-211.

The model of a "free Christian college" is worth exploring for a number of reasons. In the first place, it can help us move beyond the sociological and accidental character of "church-relatedness."

"intentional" identity which expresses the institution's hopes and goals. At stake is what the institution *aims* at becoming.[2] It is the question of intentional identity, a model or vision of church-relation, that established the focus of this paper. But in addressing this question most fruitfully, I believe, we must distinguish between two clusters of concerns about that identity.

The first cluster centers on the issue of church sponsorship itself. Churches ask why they need involve themselves in an enterprise long after state and private agencies are willing and able to do so. They ask what advantages exist for them long after the original purposes of their colleges have been met or abandoned. They ask if they ought to allocate their limited resources toward providing an expanded campus ministry program at state and non-sectarian private institutions.

As important as this issue of church sponsorship is, I believe that priority must be given to another cluster of questions. They center on the issue of how the Christian community evaluates education as such, not just how it views the sponsorship of education. This evaluation of education emerges out of the Church's own self-understanding; it is a matter of theology, not just educational strategy. Only a theological evaluation of education can provide the churches with a framework adequate for reviewing their sponsorship of institutions of higher learning. Only a theological evaluation of education can provide the framework adequate for instituting review of their intentional identity as colleges of the Church.

The basic issue is what it means to say, from a theological point of view, that a particular institution is a college *of the Church,* not merely one nostalgically related to a particular denomination. A theological understanding of the intersection of the Academy and the Church can help us understand how an institution's identity as an educational one can be viewed as an expression of the Church itself, or of the mission of the Church, albeit in a very special form and in a very delimited sense.

Some helpful distinctions for church-related higher education surfaced in 1971 with the publication of a report by the Danforth Foundation.[3] That report argues it is crucial to the well-being and even to the survival of church-related colleges that they have an indigenous self-understanding, one which consciously reflects their church background, rather than one which merely borrows secular patterns of identity and purpose. In that connection, it outlines four general models that have expressed themselves in the constitution and self-interpretation of church-related colleges and universities in the United States. They provide the germ for this investigation of church colleges' intentional identity.

The first model noted by the report is "the defender of the faith" college. Such a college operates on the theological assumption that the sponsoring denomination is in tension, if not in outright conflict, with the general culture. Its central interest is in training leadership for the church itself. Not surprisingly, the report argues, such a college has a faculty and a student body who identify deeply with the sponsor's tradition and maintain close connection with it. If one looks for examples, one might point to Oral Roberts University or to Bethel College.

The second model is "the non-affirming" college. Such institutions have only nominal and historical connections with their founding churches. In life and curriculum there is little attention paid to religion in general, even less to the concrete tradition which stands behind the institution. Such an institution—Yale or Carleton, for example—offers little attraction to either faculty or student body on religious grounds.

A third model the report calls "the church-related university." Here the connection between denomination and institution is somewhat diffuse and tenuous, the university being loosely related and yet hospitable to the church and its needs. Examples would include Fordham or Duke.

But of particular interest is the report's fourth model, that of "the free Christian college." In such an institution, the Danforth report notes, there is no attempt to control the beliefs of faculty or student body, yet a definite commitment to the theological and ecclesiastical origins of the school is fostered. In such an institution, most members of the faculty either outrightly share the religious purposes and concerns of the institution or are agreeable to working within their framework.

This model of a "free Christian college" is worth exploring for a number of reasons. In the first place, it can help us move beyond the sociological and accidental character of "church-relatedness" toward a model of intentional identity. If institutions of higher education are only church-related, then their connection to the Christian community expresses contingent identity only; theoretically it could be set aside. Second, determining what a "Christian" college or "Christian" higher education might mean could provide a concrete alternative in higher education. It carries a potential contribution to the larger Academy in a day when colleges and universities feel pressures to become more and more the same. Third, the Christian community—and American culture, for that matter—has vested interest in the outcome of such an exploration. Ours is a time

[2] Cited by Edgar M. Carlson, *The Future of Church-Related Higher Education* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), p. 59.

[3] Manning M. Pattillo, Jr., and Donald M. MacKenzie, *Church-Sponsored Higher Education in the United States* (Washington: American Council on Education, 1966).

There is a fundamental difference between a free Christian college and a "defender of the faith college." Underlying the former is a theology which sees the hallmark of life in Christ as freedom.

when fundamentalism is attempting to pre-empt the term "Christian" for itself and its narrow purposes, a time when it is presenting our culture with a particular model of what it calls "Christian education." A concerted effort to understand and implement the model of a "free Christian college," therefore, provides a crucial alternative for the church, church members, and American society as a whole.

What follows is my proposal of what such a model might mean. It begins with a theological evaluation of the Academy.

II

My basic argument is that Christian theology should recognize the genuinely *religious* significance of the Academy in its own right independent of the Church. At the same time it should insist that this religious significance is not self-derived or self-validating on the part of the Academy. The Academy needs neither Church sponsorship nor Church approval in order to have an ultimate integrity and meaning of its own. At the same time, the Church should argue—even if the Academy won't—that this integrity and meaning are given to the Academy, they are not generated by it.

This may sound either grandiose or outlandish. It is meant to be neither. The work of the Academy is the work of finite and fallible human beings. They are persons who seek to communicate insight and specific skills, to advance the frontiers of human understanding, to witness to the liberating effects of rational analysis, to exemplify and train others in the processes of reflection and criticism so that appearances and plausibilities can be wisely and relentlessly examined.

But from a theological point of view these tasks are human responses to the call of God, as limited and broken and ambiguous as they may be. Whether the Academy sees itself that way or not, Christian theology sees it responding to the God who is the author of all being, the source of all responsibility and delight, the horizon of the future, the final evaluator of all achievement, the origin for the claims of truthfulness and self-criticism, the one who calls human beings to be the images of his creativity. The Academy has ultimate significance because in its own way, it is responding to God.

Such an overarching assertion has some immediate implications. It means first, as I have noted, that the Academy has an ultimate value independent from the Church. The connectedness of the Academy to God apart from the life of the Church provides *theological* reasons why the Academy should not be subject to external restriction or control, not even the control of the Church. Human thought and inquiry should remain open in all directions, pursuing insight and critical understanding wherever they lead. By placing itself under the claims of truth, the Academy is responding to the impact of God on human life and consciousness. The Church dare not interfere with this process.

This is a fundamental difference between a free Christian college and a "defender of the faith college." Underlying the former is a theology which sees the hallmark of life in Christ as freedom—not a cheap or casual freedom, but one marked by the sign of the cross. Such a theology argues that in Christ God refuses to violate human freedom. He accepts human beings in their freedom and meets them there. He establishes and maintains relation with persons even in the misuse of their freedom. And, as Saint Paul argues again and again, the renewal of life through Christ is a life of renewed freedom. Through grace persons are enabled to reach out, to risk themselves, to grow. Growth in grace *is* freedom. It encourages maturity: increasing creativity, increasing responsibility, and increasing relatedness with others.

Such theology does not assume that academic freedom automatically liberates people or results in deeper insight into the truth. But encouraging students and scholars toward a more mature life corresponds with maximizing intellectual freedom. Moreover, because this theology links academic freedom to the freedom of divine grace, it accepts the possibility that human freedom can be mistaken. A free Christian college is not a contradiction in terms. It must be free if it takes seriously the Gospel of divine grace incarnated in Christ.

For the same reasons the Church has continually interested itself in liberal arts education. Such education is called "liberal" because it is believed that it "liberates" persons. It enables them to think about issues, and in new ways, that would not be the case apart from such education. It aims at freeing people from unwarranted opinions by enabling them to think critically in great numbers of directions. It liberates by encouraging persons to be more mature, that is, to become more responsible, more self-directing. Little wonder, then, that a Church which sees God's purpose in Christ as one of freedom has encouraged liberal arts education.

For these theological reasons, the Church must not restrict or control the Academy. The Christian community, moreover, is itself finite and fallible. Even though that to which the Church points—namely, God—is ultimate, the Church is not. Hence it has no right to control anything or hold any feature of human culture answerable to itself. In witnessing to God, it brings itself as well as culture under judgment and reveals the ultimate meaning and fulfillment of both. Here, too, is a basic theological difference which distinguishes a free Christian college from a defender of the faith college.

But the argument here is a qualified one. Christian

theology argues that the Academy has a religious value independent of the Church, but it does not see the Academy as a merely human enterprise answerable to nothing but itself. On the contrary, it argues, nothing in human experience and activity is self-grounding or self-justifying. All comes from God, belongs to him, interacts with him, is judged by him, and finds fulfillment and blessing in him. Both Academy and Church represent limited human responses to that which is greater than human beings. And their responses are "fallen." Claims to ultimate self-justification and self-direction by either Academy or Church are idolatrous.

When the Academy assumes it grounds and judges itself, it needs the criticism of the Church. The Church has a prophetic role in reminding the Academy of its own derived and responsive nature, its limitations and brokenness. But it also has a priestly role in confirming the ultimate value of the Academy's concerns and achievements, especially when the Academy loses confidence in itself or is attacked from without.

On the other hand, to the extent to which the Church becomes imperialistic and absolutistic, it needs the criticism of the Academy. For example, the Academy's recognition of "learned ignorance," that is, its insistence on the tentative and partial character of all knowledge, can become prophetic criticism of the Church's tendency to absolutize itself and its affirmations. And the ability of the Academy to open the human mind and spirit to new avenues of appreciation and awareness plays a priestly role in reminding the Church of the essential goodness of life.

In sum, because it sees the religious significance of the Academy, the Christian community has endorsed and even sponsored liberal arts education.

1) Learning is valued for its capacity for providing persons with occupational and civic skills through which they can lead productive lives, work as co-creators with God—reflecting his creativity and goodness—and concretely serve their neighbors.

2) Free intellectual inquiry is valued for its ability to break the bondage of absolutisms, prejudice, and superstition. It expresses what it means to love the truth for its own sake, not just its avowed utility. It demonstrates that human beings stand under the truth; they do not have it at their disposal.

3) Liberal arts education is valued for its capacity for opening persons to the wide vistas of human achievement and inquiry, eliciting delight and appreciation.

Historically, both Lutheranism and liberal Protestantism make important contributions to this argument. Lutheranism's doctrine of "the two kingdoms," fraught as it is with dangers and inadequacies, has the virtue of confirming the unmediated relation of the secular to God. In other words, it assumes that the secular does not require the endorsement or intervention of the Church in order to be responsive to God or be valuable to him. One implication of this view is the Lutheran understanding of "Christian vocation" which pointed people away from monasteries and convents and toward the homespun and manifold tasks found in the secular world.

But another consequence of this view has been the Lutheran insistence on the "technical autonomy" of secular life. This means that persons, either totally uninformed by the Gospel or thoroughly indifferent to it, are perfectly capable of understanding and shaping and improving human existence in the secular world. And they can do so in a way that is fully pleasing to God—whether or not they know it or care about it.

Being a Christian, Lutheran theology argues, provides no advantage whatsoever in the arenas of secular competence. For example, there is no such thing as a "Christian" cure for cancer, nor is there a "Christian" solution to the problems of the Middle East. (Although as I shall argue later, there is a Christian perspective on or evaluation of various human proposals.) And so, in looking for a brain surgeon—or a president—one should not look for one who is a believing Christian (despite current trends in American politics) but one who is competent. Who wants to be under the knife or the governance of a devout believer if he also happens to be a bumbling fool? By implication, the Academy has an integrity and value of its own apart from the Church.

In addition, liberal Protestantism has been able to acknowledge that *religiously* significant values have been generated and will continue to be so by spiritual forces outside the Christian community. It has been able to see the contributions not only of non-Christian religious traditions but also of cultural movements which have neither direct nor indirect sponsorship by the Church. Such spiritually formative contributions would include the so-called "Rights of Man," the movements toward democratization of life, the affirmation and protection of the individual, and—yes—the value of unfettered intellectual inquiry.

The religious value accorded to the Academy by liberal Protestantism is most clearly attested to by its willingness to submit the Scriptures to the full rigors of intellectual inquiry—even to the point of being the prime sponsor of that inquiry. That is an amazing development which is without parallel not only in Christian history but the history of other religions. It too shows how the Church has been able to recognize and respect the inherent integrity of the Academy and the

It is not the first task of a church-related college to be a worshipping community, or a caring community, or a tradition-conscious community; its first task is rather to be an academic community.

validity of its work apart from the Church.

If the Academy does have genuinely religious significance independent of the Church, and I strongly believe it does, it means that a church-related college should never let its concerns for the spirituality of its students, for their personal well-being and adjustment, or for the conscious affirmation of its own heritage displace or take priority over its fundamental relation to the Academy. It is not the first task of a church-related college to be a worshipping community; it is not the first task of a church-related college to be a caring community; it is not the first task of a church-related college to be a tradition-conscious community. These have importance. But it is the first task of a church-related college to be an academic community. If that is not made consistently clear, if that does not guide such a college's policies and blueprints, if that does not form the basic motivation of its administration and faculty, then it not only betrays that college's relation to the Academy but also defaults on its relation to the Church.

Because the Church sees that the Academy has religious significance, a church-related college should be an institution which is conscious of that significance and seeks to shape its priorities, policies, and program in its light. Its faculty and student body are called first and foremost to the vocation of the intellectual life—its discipline and ferment, its discomfiture and delight. To do less than that is to deny the claims of the God whom the Church confesses is Truth itself and Being itself, the one who creates and grounds intellect and life.

Theological endorsement of the Academy needs qualification, however. From its relationship to God's self-disclosure, the Church is able to see the limitations and self-deception found in the Academy. The task of Christian theology (and, therefore, part of the task of a free Christian college) is to engage in something equivalent to "investigative reporting." It needs to unmask the pretentions of the Academy and its denial of or indifference to its own ultimate foundations.

Over against claims to "objectivity" and "value-free inquiry," the Church needs to argue that there is no such thing as inquiry that can be totally divorced from the human concerns, interest, and assumptions of the inquirers. "Value-free inquiry," for example, often reflects value-laden assumptions about the nature of reality, knowledge, and humanity, which are neither self-evident nor uncontestable. The results of seemingly "objective" inquiry, moreover, need to be arranged in priority in regard to their relative importance to the expenditure of human energy and attention.

In addition, the unfettered inquiry which the Academy espouses in arguing against church control has often meant tacitly a climate of inquiry consciously indifferent—even hostile—to the Church. That is not truly free inquiry; it is restricted inquiry even if those restrictions are covert, or seemingly justified. Free intellectual inquiry so-called has sometimes collapsed into an undifferentiated relativism or outright cynicism. And preoccupation with specialization and unconcern with the compartmentalization of knowledge have sometimes masked implicit absolutisms. In addition, the more college faculties have been "rescued" from church control or even looser church relation, the more they have come to look alike. One begins to wonder if "free intellectual inquiry" really amounts to the homogenization of inquiry.

Despite the humanizing achievements of the Academy and its still greater possibilities, the Church insists that its redemptive effects are, in the final analysis, limited and ambiguous. Education no more automatically liberates persons and humanizes them than it automatically provides them with a celebrative delight in life or equips them for civic responsibility. The presence within the Academy of pedantry, the compartmentalization of knowledge, sheer tedium, and the whoring after "technique" are witnesses to the need of the Academy to find a redemption which it itself cannot provide. Such redemption can come only through the intrusion of a rank ordering of claims, the interrelation of values, and a grappling with the meaning and the realization of the genuinely human. These considerations are specifically religious.

The need of the Academy to be redeemed is underscored when it is recognized that it too represents a "principality" (to use Pauline language) which shares the "fallen" character of the world. If one wants evidence of this, one need only recall the trend toward collapsing education into the communication of useful skills, the scornful elitism which responds to the anti-intellectualism of the culture, the tyranny and Catch-22 character of accrediting agencies, the increasing influence of federal power and of large corporate structures, the constant philandering with the methodology of the "hard" sciences as the only "sure" path of knowledge, the dependence upon bureaucracy and palliatives to deal with issues like "faculty development." The list goes on and on. And while it is true that the Church needs redemption as much as the Academy does, the Church points to the ultimate source of judgment and transformation for the whole of human life.

Over against the Academy, the Church witnesses to the ultimate coherence of human knowledge and experience—an implication of monotheism. It demands that questions of human meaning and self-understanding have a definite priority (even if, quantitatively, they are given little conscious attention)—an implication of Christology. It exposes the "ideological" character of positivistic notions of knowledge, the dominance of

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technical learning, and the unchallenged assumption of secularism within the Academy—an implication of original sin. It argues that the open-ended character of inquiry and the tentative nature of assertions reflect a joyful following after a Truth greater than human understanding—an implication of discipleship.

And finally, if the Church is able to discern and respect the religious value of the Academy in its independence from the Church, it must be admitted that this provides an understanding of the Academy which the Academy is highly reluctant to make. The fact is, the properly "secular" and "humanistic" nature of the Academy all too often falls under the seductive spell of a secularism and a humanism which implies the absolute autonomy of the Academy. Then it assumes it is grounded in nothing but itself, that free intellectual inquiry has only finite moorings, and that the values of the Academy are substitutes for religious values—not the expression of them. In such a situation, the Church affirms the Academy's independence from the Church but not its avowed independence from God; it confirms the Academy's integrity by simultaneously arguing for its transcendent basis.

III

Having come this far, we must now take another step and ask how, given the independence of the Academy from the Church, there can be such a thing as a "Christian" college. If its concern and program is shaped by its participation in the Academy, what remains that can be deemed "Christian"?

The tempting answer is to identify the "Christian" character of such institutions with issues concerning the non-academic features of the college. In other words, student life policies, activities, interpersonal relationships, and the like are made the provenance of the Church while the academic life of the college is relegated to the Academy. I believe this is a fundamental mistake.

The bridge between the terms "free college" and "Christian" is a theological one. It is not just enough to include a religion requirement in the curriculum, have prominent church members sit on the Board of Regents, sponsor the religious life of the students through a chapel and a chaplaincy, or create special programs designed for church members. What is necessary is *to put the aims and program of education into a perspective informed by the faith and life of the Church.* This is a theological perspective that belongs to the Church as a whole, not just to professional theologians. It belongs to the Church as it gathers and realizes itself in the Christian members of the administration, faculty, student body, and constituency. It belongs to the Church as it crystallizes something of its life and mission in the life and program of a college.

As Julian Hartt puts it,

> The Christian community is not in its distinctive business until it has related all the principal features of human life, in all the peculiarities of local formation, to that truth it calls Revelation. So far then as it is Christian, a university must honor this same obligation. Indeed a Christian center of higher learning has a quite distinctive form of this obligation that derives from its more general obligation to pursue and promulgate the truth by the refinement of the powers of criticism.[4]

Christian faith does not provide direct answers to pedagogical and intellectual issues, but it can provide a definite perspective for taking up these issues, arranging them in priority, and enabling believing Christians to evaluate the human suggestions that keep surfacing. A "Christian college," then, is one which tries to identify and articulate a perspective on education that is informed by the Gospel. Such a perspective is neither obvious nor monolithic. It is a matter of continuing debate and revision. But its touchstone is found in its turning again and again to Jesus and his impact on others as the central clue for understanding human existence. Such an understanding is consistently relevant to interpreting and evaluating the educational process.

Take as an example the trend toward casting education in terms of occupational training. Placing that trend in a Christian perspective would include understanding what "Christian vocation" means, recognition of the religious significance of intellectual life, seeing the ways in which Christian faith has a stake in issues of civic responsibility, and facing directly the fact that few persons grow up with either the ability or inclination to appreciate "the life of the mind."

Similarly, in asking what is education's role in prompting civic awareness and involvement, no particular answer can be called "Christian." But because Christians see life in the light of Jesus the Christ they have a frame of reference within which to evaluate specific proposals. A concrete example of this can be seen in the way certain church groups and their colleges promoted the cause of Abolition. Abolition of slavery was not a uniquely Christian idea, but it was one which demanded to be placed in Christian (that is, theological) perspective.

At stake is what the Roman Catholic tradition calls "spiritual formation." This refers to a process of influence which shapes a person's fundamental sensibilities, concerns, aspirations, priorities, self-understanding, and wider sense of what the world is and what it adds up to. College education is involved in this pro-

[4] Julian N. Hartt, *Theology and the Church in the University* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), pp. 115-116.

What is at stake is a sense of who we are and what we are up to as academics that is held answerable to and in fruitful conversation with the disclosure of human life given in Jesus the Christ.

cess—in the overall design of its program, its course offerings and shapings, the skills and appreciations it encourages, the pedagogical techniques it employs, the relative visibility of social and ethical concerns it addresses, and the like.

A Christian college, I believe, would be one that is aware of this process of spiritual formation and focuses on it self-consciously. In addition a Christian college would be one where a concerted intellectual effort was made to discern what are the outlines of a Christian "frame of reference" or "perspective" within which to place education's content and patterns.

So, for example, if it is argued that a Christian frame of reference should not subscribe to the viability of "creationism" in dealing with the origin of the universe and planetary life, this requires as many theologically relevant considerations as it does "purely" biological ones. In addition, it will probably need the assistance of philosophical analysis in order to sort out certain assumptions about the nature of knowledge and evidence and hypotheses.

Or, to cite another example, if the viability of the free market economy is argued for in the economics department, a Christian frame of reference will be sensitive to the fact that this is not just a "purely" economic judgment. Rather, it is one that entails assumptions about human nature, the nature of social structures, the dynamics of power, and the like. These are considerations which are relevant to other disciplines within the Academy and to the theology of the Church.

Or, if courses in Physical Education are included as requirements in the college curriculum, there is the opportunity to shape them in light of Christian evaluation of both the life-affirming and the destructive potential in competitive athletics, the psychological ramifications of team sports, and the value of life-long patterns of physical fitness.

A Christian college, therefore, is

1) one that is aware of the reality of "spiritual formation" and how it is relevant to the manifold elements of its life and program, and
2) one where a self-consciously Christian perspective within which to place issues of spiritual formation is cared about, articulated, debated, and made a component feature of the college's life.

This includes such considerations as overall curriculum design, concrete classroom concerns and goals, and the shaping of existing and future faculty.

What is at stake is a sense of who we are and what we are up to as academics that is held answerable to and in fruitful conversation with the disclosure of human life given in Jesus the Christ. If a "Christian college" is capable of realization, then it must be in the conscious framework within which is placed the intellectual-valuational-humanistic life of the community in its spiritually formative role. That framework is theological. That framework is answerable to the Church's understanding of Christ.

Let me be bold—or foolhardy—enough to venture what I see as some implications for church-sponsored education that emerge out of this particular model.

1) We need to debate and make plain a consciously Christian evaluation of education, of its achievements and possibilities and limits, of its value. The term "education" comes from the Latin *educere* meaning "to lead forth." But we need common agreement about what it means. Leading forth *from* what? Leading forth *to* what? What is it that does the leading? How does it lead? And how are we to know that we are being led forth and not "backwards" or "in circles"?
2) Consequently, faculty and administration need to speak openly and spiritedly about the conscious assumptions and philosophies of education that motivate the work of each and all. They also need to recognize and evaluate the still greater number of unconscious assumptions about education that bounce around this institution and the larger Academy, shaping what they are doing in a fundamental way.
3) Hand in hand with this continuing discussion, there needs to be a theologically informed evaluation of it. Educational assumptions, methods, and goals need to be reviewed to see where they are connected with the understanding of life Christians see given in Jesus and his impact on others. This means that greater theological literacy on the part of faculty and administrators needs encouragement. Academics who jointly want to create a free Christian college need to be able to discover theologically relevant options in their own disciplines, in their style of teaching, in their handling of students, and in their own scholarship. The self-consciously Christian academic should be concerned about this whether or not the institution at which he teaches and works is related to the Church, or whether it understands itself in theologically Christian terms or not. But a free Christian college should encourage and promote the process by providing a public forum and public encouragement.
4) The appointment policies of such colleges need careful review. The religious significance of the

Colleges that aim at consciously being free Christian colleges need not be apologetic about it. The fact of the matter is that pluralism is a creative and ameliorating element in American society.

Academy establishes the priorities of a free Christian college. The commitment of the faculty to the intellectual life, to the discipline of scholarship, to the art of teaching, and to the liberal arts as a form of life (and not just a description of certain curriculum requirements) is of fundamental importance. Personal piety, specific church affiliation—or lack of it, concern for creating a "caring community," while relevant and even laudable, are of lesser importance.

5) Needing equal stress, however, is the need for current and potential faculty and administrators willing to debate and construct a Christian framework within which to see education, the intellectual life, and the liberal arts. This requires the strong and visible presence within the college of persons who are informed and responsive members of the Church, whose concern about such a Christian framework represents a measure of their own personal discipleship. But that is not automatically equivalent to mere sociological membership in the Christian community generally or a particular denomination specifically. Better a non-Lutheran, for example, who is genuinely concerned to see the Academy within a theological framework informed by the Gospel than a merely sociological Lutheran; better a non-Christian, for example, who is willing to consider a religious framework for the life of the Academy and who will debate a specifically Christian framework than a theologically indifferent Christian; better an agnostic free from secular humanism's hostility to religion who is socratically probing and reflective about a religious interpretation of the Academy than someone who is only nominally "religious." The realization of a free Christian college requires the conscious and responsible building up of a community of scholars who are interested in and capable of articulating a Christian perspective on the Academy and their place within it. Non-Christian academics who can in good conscience enter into such conversation and do so with competence and enthusiasm assist in this task.

6) Colleges that aim at consciously being free Christian colleges need not be apologetic about it. The fact of the matter is that pluralism is a creative and ameliorating element in American society (and world community for that matter). Contrary to what some educators believe, higher education did not create this pluralism; it capitalized upon it. That pluralism lies in the religious, cultural, ethnic, and regional diversity of peoples and groups; it is a pluralism that underlies the emergence of church-related colleges. At a time when institutions of higher education are consciously trying to differentiate themselves from one another, it would be ironic in the highest degree if colleges ignored the heterogeneity implicit in their origins. Education, the intellectual life, and the liberal arts flourish not by homogenization and generalization, not by compartmentalization and detachment. They are stimulated, rather, by the lively interchange of concrete points of view; they call for engagement, even if it is self-qualifying and open-ended. A Christian college that is free—appreciative of academic freedom and free from narrow parochialism—contributes to such an interchange.

7) A free Christian college can be a source of enrichment and prophetic criticism for the life of the Church. It has this potential role since it stands within both Academy and Church. It can point out to the Church the religious value of the Academy and the ways in which it rightly corrects the Church. It can remind the Church of the religious value of education and the intellectual life and thereby resist the anti-intellectualism that constantly seeks to mask itself as piety, dominate the life of the Church, and make it a victim of irrationality, fanaticism, and hatred of the Truth. By bringing the Academy into the Church, a free Christian college can help the Church discern and combat its own absolutism, its cultural captivity, its parochialism and loss of its moral fibre.

8) A free Christian college consciously fosters in its student body an awareness of its own education from the standpoint of "Christian vocation." It encourages understanding potential employment from the standpoint of service. It outlines the scope of contemporary civic awareness and responsibility. It distinguishes concern for the substance of education (expanded appreciation, critical thought, etc.) from concern with the form of education (requirements, diploma, etc.). It values intellectual reflection and life-long learning. In short, it helps students see the religious significance of the Academy. This is most effectively done by faculty and administrators who are able to understand their own participation in the Academy from this very standpoint of "Christian vocation."

9) Academics and administrators who want to build a free Christian college should seek to embody in their own professional lives the values the Church sees in the Academy. They should try to reflect the liberating character of learning. They should be conscious of the ways learning impinges on citizenship. They should select pedagogical skills and

The model of a free Christian college outlines a concrete possibility for church-related colleges' reflection about intentional identity and the concrete life and program that can be built on it.

aims that encourage maximizing the responsible freedom of students. They should find room for a diversity of avocational activities and interests. They should want to interrelate and integrate the wide scope of intellectual inquiry and human activity without neglecting their own discipline. On the contrary, they should see how their own discipline can inform and assist others.

IV

As we have seen, the life of the Church and that of the Academy have intersected from the very early years of Christian history. At some times they have conflicted with each other, at others they have converged; at some times they have gone their separate ways, at others they have been sources of mutual stimulation. But the question of how they *ought* to be related to each other surfaces when one takes up the question of the intentional identity of church-related colleges.

The Danforth Report calls attention to the model of the "free Christian college." But at issue is what that notion means and how it prescribes the intersection between Academy and Church. In order to stimulate and further that task, I have presented a dialectical evaluation of the Academy from a Christian perspective, one that finds religious significance and independence for the Academy apart from the Church but which, at the same time, insists that the Academy's autonomy is not absolute or unqualified in the light of what the Church sees in Jesus. The heart of this qualified evaluation is a Christian appreciation of the free character of the Academy.

I have pushed the argument even further by taking up the question of how a college can in any sense be "Christian" and not merely church-related. Such a question reflects concern for conscious purpose, not simply historical accident; it looks for motivation generated by vision, not the momentum of unchecked inertia. I have argued first that a college is "Christian" when it attempts to place its academic program and goals in theological perspective. Second, I have asserted that a Christian college is aware of how its program and goals effect spiritual formation and reviews that spiritual formation in the light of the Gospel.

I believe this model of a free Christian college outlines a concrete possibility for church-related colleges' reflection about their intentional identity and the concrete life and program that can be built on it. Such a model, and the conscious shaping effect it can have on their future, is warranted by the current states of both the Academy and the situation of higher education in the United States. The Academy can only stand to gain by dealing with greater measures of intellectual pluralism; it needs the contributions of self-conscious perspectives including those of free Christian colleges.

In addition, the present state of American higher education promises to promote colleges that can demonstrate distinguishable identities. As in the case of the Academy, pluralism seems to be the direction in which to move. Once again, such specificity and pluralism are served by free Christian colleges.

Moreover, both Church and society need a clear alternative to the fundamentalist model for what is billed as "Christian education." If there is no alternative to a "defender of the faith" college, or a "non-affirming" college, or merely "church-related" college, Christian people and Americans at large will identify a consciously Christian perspective on higher education with parochialism, suspicion of the Academy, and ecclesiastical imperialism.

What is sad and frightening to recognize is that church-related colleges are free to respond to these challenges by ignoring the question of intentional identity. They can merely coast on their sociologically defined identities. They can take refuge in primary identities that are ethnocentric, regional, and denominational. Yet the model of a free Christian college is a viable possibility. The question that is left to haunt us is not the formal one which asks whether or not such a model exists, rather it is the material one which asks whether or not the concern and will to implement it can be found.

Hail Mary

With all the chutzpah
of a fly lighting on the swatter,
God assumed a human body.

He knew what he was getting into—
dust recycled on its way to dust—
he knew that loads across
the shoulders make a body weary,
that skin is torn by thorns
and flesh is pierced by spears.

And yet, on the wheel of eternity,
the potter entered the clay.

That was hard, very hard,
even for an angel to explain to Mary
that extraterrestrial day
in dusty Nazareth.

Bernhard Hillila



A Russian Christmas Meditation

Richard Lee

The perversity of my editor's deadlines means I must write a Christmas column to him in Indiana in October while I happen to be traveling in Russia nearer to the anniversary of the Communist Revolution. He may think such a dislocation frees the mind for a fresh thought, but about all I can see in common to the nearing celebration of the Revolution here and Christmas there is that the weather for me in Russia in October is nearly what it will be like for him in Indiana in December.

And yet my editor has been known to be right. His unseasonable deadline does stir a thought which I at least might not have considered were I not in Russia compelled to think proleptically about Christmas. That thought concerns the poor and all for whom Christmas means being "filled with good things" while "the rich are sent empty away." Those words from the Blessed Virgin's Song of the Incarnation especially occur to me today in a country about to celebrate the most colossally failed revolution in history.

One is not here long before it is apparent that the two great "Redeemer Nations" of the world contest each other in their service of the same god. Productivity. The contest, of course, is complicated almost beyond the human capacity to cope by their counterproductivity of apocalyptic weapons which could end the contest—and the contestants—catastrophically. Meanwhile, the helpless bystanders of this agony are the poor of the world below vastly wealthy America and just beneath tolerably well off Russia.

It is, I think, difficult for Christians to keep a faithful perspective when Christmas calls them more to a concern for the poor than to any concern they may have for the "long, twilight struggle" between Russia and America. The Christian faith is obviously not an economic program much less an economic system, but it is fully centered upon the poor. At Christmas we recall our faith is saving faith in Him "who was rich yet became poor so that by his poverty we might become rich." No less do we remember our faith is serving faith for the poor whom He blesses with the Kingdom of God.

It seems to me such faith serves first in the economic realm by cleansing us of our sentiments concerning the poor. They are not the deserving poor of Victorian uplift. Not the virtuous poor of Tolstoyan mysticism. Not the messianic poor of creaking Marxist orthodoxy. Not the politically volatile poor of welfare state handouts. Perhaps not even the poor "in spirit" of Matthew's bourgeois gloss of Luke. Faith keeps the focus on the poor who, in words of one syllable, do not have what they need to live at all or live at all well. It is these poor our Lord assured us would always be with us—"and whenever you will you can do good to them." These poor may know nothing about themselves except their need for just about everything beside our sentiments. Secondly, it seems to me that once faith sufficiently astringes our sentiments it may lay hold of our Lord's mystery concerning the poor. He who came to "preach good news to the poor" consummated that coming by consecrating them with His real presence. Indeed, the depth of the mystery is that our Lord Himself hungers and thirsts in the poor—and inasmuch as the least of them are relieved we do it unto Him. For faith His assurance that "you will always have the poor with you" equals His assurance "lo, I am with you always even to the end of the age."

In His consecration of the poor they take on no virtue in themselves and remain fully themselves. But they become for faith one of the "outward and visible signs" of His real presence, and in-with-and-under their relief He offers the "inward and spiritual grace" of the Kingdom of God. The rich may be disabused of their morality moved by sentiment and restored to His life generously moved by His mystery. And the poor may receive the means of this life which makes any hunger and thirst for His life to come genuinely unsentimental.

Our Lord's mystery concerning the poor is, of course, a stumbling block if not utter folly to capitalist and communist alike. The mysteries of God are never human projects nor are they easy to live with for anybody. His real presence with the poor has no programmatic relevance to any economic system at the same time it is of utmost relevance to the faithful who must make their own judgments about the economic systems in which they stand as well as their personal wealth in those systems. Stewards of the mysteries of God must, by definition, be stewards of the poor.

Travel, as they say, is very narrowing. Under duress of deadline for a Christmas column in October while uprooted in Russia one thinks homeward to that other, greater "Redeemer Nation" where freedom remains for the faithful to ask what its economic system does first for the poor, then for the rich, and how rich and poor can meet to receive one of the mysteries of the Incarnation. Any day that asking happens is at least Advent, and Christmas could be coming.

Richard Lee *is on sabbatical leave in Cambridge from Christ College in Valparaiso University.*

Television



Vietnam II?

Is Central America a Replay of an Old Script?

The relationship between the mass media and American political life is obscured by myth and illusion.

James Combs

It is one of the disciplines of the student of mass media not to accept on its face what so many people, in and out of the industry, seem to accept as chiseled-in-stone truth. Journalistic and political rhetoric abounds in phrases mouthed without much reflection: "a free press," the "adversary relationship" of press and politicians, "media bias," "manipulation of the press," and so on. Such terms are just rhetoric, and serve functions for people by being emptied of meaning. It is too uncomfortable to give up our illusions, so the myths remain to comfort us that what we want to believe is true. The media is biased against those we like; the press really is free; the adversary relationship works.

The difficulty is that such myths are rudimentary theories we cherish, and like all our beautiful theories, are often darkly murdered by gangs of brutal facts. In what sense is the American press free, since it is largely owned by a small number of very wealthy people? Is it true that the press is free only if you own one? How do you have an adversary relationship, when as in the Cuban missile crisis, the press cooperated with the government by withholding news, faithfully accepting the government's version of what caused the showdown, and hailing the resolution as a great patriotic victory?

If, as every group claims, the media are biased negatively against us and positively for our enemies, how do they manage to do that? If the national media are so manipulated by successive recent Administrations, why do political leaders and spokespersons in those governments bitterly attack the media, express frustration over their independence and their penchant for reporting things the people in power don't like to have told, and give them belated blame (or credit) for bringing them down in the end?

But is it not also now the case that the national press is being accused of being "soft on Reagan," relatively uncritical, serving up creampuff questions at press conferences, acting even as Administration shills, and submissively acquiescing in Presidential pseudo-events (such as Nancy bringing out Ron's birthday cake at the conclusion of a televised press conference)? The charges and defenses of mass-mediated news, and even the evidence, are so conflicting that anyone who tries to make sense out of the role of the mass media in American society is reduced to asking that age-old question, What, after all, is truth?

The truth, to evade answering, is that nobody is quite sure just what is true about this question. In politics, of course, what is argued about the news media depends on your point of view; but the argument rages among scholars too, with quite honorable (and some dishonorable) people on all sides of such questions. But one thing is certain: politicians, scholars, and mass mediators are convinced of the media's importance in shaping opinions, political acts, and the outcome of historical events. If some, indeed nearly all, American politicians lash out at the news media when under heat, they are simply acting out a verbal equivalent of those indicted mobsters who emerge from courthouses under siege by the cameras and take a swing at the cameramen, or, more amusing, try to cover the camera lens as if to shut out the world they know is watching them. No doubt most politicos have in moments of frustration wished they could shut the world out so summarily.

President Reagan is a current case in point. Here's a man who is long used to the camera, does well in controlled settings before it (has any President ever gotten on and off helicopters on the White House lawn with such finesse?), professes to like reporters and respect their profession (we're all in show biz), and generally thinks (with some reason, his opponents might grumble in reply) that the press treats him fairly. But once in a while, this happy symbiotic clear sky is clouded by a discouraging word, first from one side and then from the other. The national press corps complains about lack of access to the President, favoritism for friendly reporters, and having to hang around during long Presidential vacations.

But recently Reagan has revived an ancient Presidential complaint, one curiously out of character for him. In a speech before a friendly audience, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he condemned press "discouraging hype and hoopla" over his policies toward Central America and argued that the major news organizations were giving the nation a distorted view of what was happening there. Presidential sensitivity to the charge that *he* doesn't know what is happening there, or what we're doing there, cropped up in his radio pronouncement the week before that "the great majority of Americans don't know which side we are on" (or probably care, he didn't dare add).

In the VFW speech, he did give the national press an out by saying they too are so misled that journal-

James Combs, *currently on leave at the University of Tennessee, teaches Political Science at Valparaiso University.*

Reagan's frustration with the press is a common Presidential malady which can be expected to be cured if things go our way in Central America—but not if they don't.

ists in some cases were "reporting the disinformation and demagoguery they hear coming from people who put politics ahead of our national interest." Presumably these rabblerousers are the political critics of his Central America policy, chiefly Democratic Presidential contenders who can smell the potential for a good campaign issue next year. But the specific question was left open again: which demagogic politicians are leading the news media around by the nose and cynically feeding us "disinformation"?

Media spokesmen were quick to deny their complicity with these unnamed demagogues who were conspiring to undermine "the national interest." But the media response was predictable too, almost with a bemused haven't-we-lived-through-this-before air: the Reagan Administration, they maintained, was setting the agenda in Central America, including the visible military intervention; they couldn't see the progress on human rights and economic development the Administration did; and they were not part of any anti-Reagan cabal nor beholden to any prejudged viewpoint. Looking across the range of TV, news magazines, and newspaper reports from Central America, I find myself a great deal of confusion about what is happening, what should happen, what can be done to make what we want happen, and most of all, what we down deep inside don't want to happen. So what is truth, and who are the disinformers?

Reagan's frustration with the press is a common Presidential malady which can be expected to be cured if things go our way in Central America. If they don't, then the disease is likely to get worse and poison the amiable relationship he has largely enjoyed to date. For if things go badly in a major foreign policy commitment—as Central America by now certainly is—then Presidents and their minions are tempted to play kill-the-messenger, and *then*, by golly, you really do have an adversary relationship. "Distortions" occur when the media are bringing back the bad news.

Now Mr. Reagan, probably more so than most Presidents, likes to accentuate the positive—the economy is getting better, the safety net has no holes in it, America is "respected" in the world again, and so forth. It is at least an irritant, and sometimes a major threat, if major media organizations question that. No President likes to see his view of reality contradicted.

If you read and watch the gamut of perspectives on Central America, you wind up not knowing just what the hell you ought to believe.

The problem has been compounded for recent Presidents for a wide variety of reasons. The most important of these, I believe, is that they have inherited a legacy of lies from former Presidents. Reagan seems sincere and well-meaning (as did Ford and Carter too), but when Presidents try to explain what we need to do people either ignore them or don't believe them. So when frustration sets in over people's lack of enthusiasm for some great new political enterprise, journalists get tagged as the villains, the distorters of democratic communion between leader and led. The bald fact is that the led trust the media more than leaders, or to put it another way, they believe politicians lie more than TV newscasters.

For another reason, the media have proliferated to the point that we have access to a wide and conflicting variety of viewpoints and explanations. If you read and watch the gamut of perspectives on Central America, you wind up not knowing what the hell to believe. There is probably less of a media-wide shared definition of the situation (sometimes called "pack journalism") than obtained in, say, the Korean War or the Cuban missile crisis. The mass media now are more pluralistic, less deferential, and perhaps even less "patriotic" (in the worst sense of that word) than before.

Even Reagan's celebrated charm can't disarm most of the White House press corps at press conferences, and Sam Donaldson just won't shut up. Journalists will not take official reality on face from the White House, the State Department, or the Pentagon; they are—like many, perhaps most, of their fellow Americans—skeptical of what the government tells them. They usually assume the government is lying, and they look for the hidden agenda or truth behind the lies.

Official briefings and statements about what we are doing in Central America are followed by media discoveries that the briefings and statements convey less than the truth. After Pentagon and White House assurances that U.S. Army "advisors" in El Salvador were not carrying arms or going into combat, lo and behold, CNN News quickly found a thoroughly armed American heading into the jungle. Reporters interview the guerillas there, doubt seriously the reported improvement in human rights violations, and regularly discredit Administration claims about the progress of the war. They have made the "covert" war to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua rather overt, have pointed out the brutalities of the right-wing governments of the region (they have reported leftist atrocities and suppressions as well), and in general have communicated skepticism, even cynicism, about whether the Reagan Administration knows what it's doing in the area.

There is, as everyone knows, another reason why relations between Presidents and press have changed:

TV news may or may not be hostile to the idea of a big American commitment to Central America, but it doesn't matter: all it has to do is report it, just show it.

Vietnam. Reagan, ever the Great Communicator, constantly conjures it up by insisting that Central America will never become another Vietnam, vowing never to commit American troops, and insisting that any analogy between the two situations is spurious. But with the legacy of Vietnam, both public and press have a tough time believing him. In a sense, that is not his fault, but complaining about it will not change it. Any military move, or even threat, reminds people of past Presidents who sent "advisors" to Vietnam, who sought no wider war, who pointed to the domino theory, who saw Communists swarming ashore at San Diego, who justified the sacrifice in blood and treasure because of our "vital interests," who were increasingly disbelieved, and who blamed —and harassed and intimidated— the media for the disbelief.

The important American mass media, TV news most prominently, are not neutral in reporting, but they are not necessarily hostile. The "distortions" they report are mediations of confusions among both politicians and public; or, to put it another way, they reflect, and accentuate thereby, the extent to which an Administration is not doing well, not communicating well, not being believed. Vietnam was the precedent of a "living room war," a monumental confusion that was mediated by television into our homes in frightful color. War would never be the same; indeed, many observers think it impossible for America ever to commit itself to another Vietnam or to anything close to it.

TV news may or may not be hostile to the idea of a big American commitment to Central America, but it doesn't matter: all it has to do is report it, just show it. Terrible memories return with the shots of Americans disembarking from helicopters, of villages being burned, of napalm and jungle trails and executed villagers, of terrorist bombings of American personnel, of corrupt and reactionary local governments, of hungry and dispossessed peasants, and, most of all, of American casualties. Any American President who would commit the nation to another such venture would, in my estimation, be commiting political suicide. Perhaps that is a bad thing, but politicians should not treat the skepticism of press and public lightly. Perhaps dirty little wars are only possible nowadays when people can't see them. How much does the Soviet public see of Afghanistan?

Someone has remarked that Ronald Reagan seems to want to re-stage most of the twentieth century—the Coolidge Prosperity, the Great Depression and New Deal, World War II, the Cold War, the Eisenhower Normalcy, even the Sixties, which created Reagan politically. Some of that is worth restaging, but even as TV images of unemployment, bread lines, and dead factories are all too reminiscent of the Depression, the TV images of Central America are all too reminiscent of Vietnam. Historical analogies may be misleading, but they are irresistible, and both press and public react to what politicians do in the present by references to the past.

There are not many Americans around any more who can relate the plight of the unemployed and dispossessed to memories of the Depression. This tends, at least to some extent, to defuse economics as an issue. But Central America remains potentially explosive, since Vietnam is so recent and its memories so traumatic. Members of the news media were part of the Vietnam experience, and they were as affected by it as most Americans. "Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam," concluded Michael Herr in his book on media coverage of Nam, "we've all been there." If TV journalists are trying to keep us out of war in Central America, it's because they, like many Americans, have been there; they learned from it the bitter lesson that people in power can create insanities. Whether the people in power now, or in subsequent Administrations, have learned what newspeople learned remains to be seen. We shall soon see whether the skepticism, and even hostility, of TV news over the Central-American adventure is well founded, and whether we are going there again.

Theatre

The American Players Theatre dreams of creating a classical theatre in the heart of the country.

What's a Director to Do?

A Shapeless Production Of Marlowe's *Tamburlaine*

John Steven Paul

The American Players Theatre, nestled atop a heavily forested hill in the Frank Lloyd Wright country near Spring Green, Wisconsin, has cast Nature herself in a stunningly dramatic role. The rough-hewn shafts that tower above the unroofed stage of this three-year-old theatrical enterprise are strangely reminiscent of the eerie forms of Stonehenge.

And, like Stonehenge, you don't simply drive up to the place. After a forty-five minute drive from Madison (and, despite information in the publicity, Spring Green's a four-hour drive from Chicago) you park somewhere below the theatre and take a deceptively short trek to the ticket booth. Here, of course, you pay your money, and are only then pointed in the direction of a little breach in the thicket, marked by a pair of johnny-on-the-spot portable toilets. Ascending the winding, dusty trail through opulent flora and occasional fauna you may wish to stop for a momentary breather on the wooden benches placed every few hundred yards—unless, for some inexplicable reason, you arrive at box office level just before curtain.

In return for your climb you get a gorgeous view from the crest of the hill, encompassing the timbered stage, the amphitheatre and support buildings, the lush green forests, and about a dozen-and-a-half portable johnnys (fourteen labeled "women" and four "men"). This is the remarkable American Players Theatre, remotely but magnificently situated in a place that, but for bloodthirsty mosquitoes, grinding cicadae, and a clamorous breeze rushing through the leaves of all those trees, is perfect for classics of Western drama.

The APT installation is the dream-coming-true of Korean-born Randall Duk Kim and two associates. Kim, a veteran of more than twenty years on the stage including a performance as Hamlet for the Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis, serves as the company's artistic director and principal actor. He is a very fine talent. In 1977, according to the souvenir program, Kim and four others conceived the idea of an American classical theatre. Then located in Washington, D.C., the group presented its first production, a one-man show about Walt Whitman starring Kim, to mixed reviews. After some more cogitation, the group decided it wished to be "closer to nature, in an area where goods and services were less expensive, and where a company could better know and interact with its neighbors."

WISCONSIN! Two of the group resigned. Kim and the two others searched Wisconsin for a congenial location—and a base of support—and settled on and in Spring Green, up the hill from the Wisconsin River and down the road from the Frank Lloyd Wright Restaurant. While the group is "only at the beginning of this herculean labor," which they hope will eventually result in a "national theatre" touring from a home base in "America's heartland," it is an impressive beginning. The APT now looks back on four summers of activity, a nine-play repertoire, sustained volunteer support, and a long list of institutional, corporate, and individual donors.

The glossy program book, which costs four dollars, binds together the usual lists of casts and crews and contributors, commentary on the plays in repertory, and insights into artistic decisions. There is also a good deal of high-flown philosophy, some of which is quite revealing, especially when read by stage light. We seek, writes the artistic director,

> to realize a theatre that serves a humanizing and integrating function in the growth and well-being of the American community. . . . We long for a classical theatre that can draw the members of the community together to share and celebrate a moment of common humanity as the living mortally encounters the dead through dramatic embodiments of ancestral memories and dreams. . . . With the revolutionary advance of mass communication and high technology in our time, the classical stage, with its inherent mortality, its life dimensions and its human proportions becomes increasingly an invaluable and necessary means of vital contact and personal dialogue for which there can be no substitute. . . . We have come to the middle of the country to wage our battle for this theatre; in becoming a part of this family community, still so close to nature and elemental forces, we have the rare opportunity to make immediate and undreamt-of connections not only with classical world drama but with human life as manifested in earlier times.

The APT philosophy draws its own bravos and benisons from all of us middle-border types—especially those who toil in university theatres. Its ultra-slick packaging and super-reverent phraseology notwithstanding, we can hardly afford to be cynical in the face of such idealism, for, in essence, it constitutes the theatre's only real chance in an uncongenial social setting. The philosopher goes on to speak about how the plays will look on stage: "We have a passion

John Steven Paul *teaches in the Department of Speech and Drama at Valparaiso University and writes regularly on Theatre for* The Cresset.

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to know all the plays scheduled for production in the years ahead, intimately, on their own terms, complete and uncut. With conscientious study and diligent practice, *we are determined to be guided and taught by the texts themselves. . . .*"

This last pledge of unflinching dedication to the text is entirely in harmony with the foregoing statements of purpose and principle. The classics are the classics because of the timeless significance of their plots, characters, themes, music, spectacle, and language. The text is the vessel of that significance, and, thus, the text should be studied and revealed upon the stage. When audiences come to the theatre to see and hear the play they expect to get what the dramatist has written and thus what has come to the rest of us in the text. On a first reading, Randall Duk Kim's reification of the text as a guide and a teacher seems only an enthusiastic conceit. But another segment of the program, "On Directing," indicates just how literally the APT understands the philosophy of text as guide and teacher.

> . . . at American Players Theatre the play itself is considered the primary director, with three collaborating directors serving as guides to the text and making the artistic decisions essential in transferring a play from the page to the stage. . . . Making the artistic decisions, however, does not mean that the collaborating directors dominate the artistic input, for in reality the direction is a collaboration of more than thirty people, including the entire acting company, the costume and lighting designers, music composer, and even to a degree the technicians.

The APT cultivates all this collaboration in order to avoid "limiting the production to a single artistic vision." And, perhaps, its notion of a multiple or collaborative artistic vision is consonant with its larger goals with regard to productions of the classics. What we call "the classics" were all written in a time before the theatre had any place for "single artistic visions," or directors for that matter. In Shakespeare's London, the playwright may have served as a guide for the actors in his play; he may even have arranged the players on the stage. Costumes, properties, and stage business were worked out by the actors according to prevailing conventions. Actors were famed for their personal rhetorical styles and skills.

Whatever unity there may have been was the result of what we would now term the ensemble; that is, a group of players had worked and become familiar with one another's work over the course of time. On the great perspective scene stages of the Italian and French Baroque, painters and stage architects worked quite independently of actors and stage managers. Actors and plays were of relatively minor importance in the spectacular theatre of scenic artists such as the Bibienas, Torelli, Piranesi, Inigo Jones.

Independent collaboration in the theatre gave way to the director in the late nineteenth century when two aesthetic impulses established themselves. The first was antiquarianism, a natural child of an age obsessed with history and historicism. Producers such as Charles Kemble, Henry Irving, and the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen tried to make the "old plays" correspond to what historians and archeologists had discovered about the periods in which the plays were set. Settings, properties, and costumes for *Julius Caesar* ought to look like those of first century Rome, for example; *Macbeth* ought to look like medieval Scotland. Coordinating and unifying these elaborate antiquarian efforts required a new position in the theatre: the regisseur or director.

The other innovation in theatre aesthetics in the late nineteenth century was "total theatre," or what Richard Wagner named *gesamtkunstwerk*. A single, magnificent concept in the mind of a Wagner, or Max Reinhart, or Edward Gordon Craig, or David Belasco was to be incarnated upon the stage, with every resource of the theatre, including actors, proceeding from and supporting the central concept. This approach to theatrical production is largely what has come down to us today in what the American Players Theatre program calls "conventional productions." Such an approach may call to mind egomaniacal directors pompously ordering other arists around the theatre. But it also must immediately be said that while there had been dramatic poetry for centuries, it was only after the advent of unified theatrical production that there could be poetry in the theatre. In the best sense, the director is a poet or maker of theatre art.

If we take the APT at its word, as set down in the program, it is attempting to restore an approach to theatrical production with which William Shakespeare himself might have been comfortable: an approach where everyone contributes to the production according to what the text has taught him. Of course, the playwright isn't around to answer questions, so, according to the program, research is the key to the effectiveness of this method. Everyone does his own research. There are usually three or four people listed as "directors" who serve as guides—rather like research librarians.

The proof of this method is in the putting of a play on the stage. The newest play in the company's repertoire is a jim-dandy test case: *Tamburlaine The Great, Part I* written by Christopher Marlowe and first performed before an Elizabethan audience in 1586. Don't feel too bad if you're not as familiar with *Tamburlaine* as with some of Marlowe's more famous works such as *The Jew Of Malta, Edward II,* and *The Massacre at Paris.* His last play, *Dr. Faustus,* is most familiar in a movie version starring Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor. Marlowe was the dramatist who introduced blank-verse

What are we to make of such a butcher as Tamburlaine? A reading of the text suggests that Marlowe was fascinated by the very ruthlessness and determination of the man.

dramatic poetry to the Elizabethan public theatres, and most scholars feel that he would have been greater than Shakespeare had his life not been cut short in a tavern fight. There is a persistent if minority opinion that Marlowe did not die in a tavern fight but slipped out of England to Italy as a political persona non grata where he continued to write plays, smuggling them north to theatre managers under the improbable pseudonym of "Will Shakespeare," then an actor in London.

In this his first play, Marlowe relates the history of the fourteenth-century Mongolian conqueror Timur Khan, or Tamburlaine, whose aspirations took him from life as a shepherd in Scythia to King of Persia and tyrant of much of Asia. The action of the play is fairly simple. Tamburlaine and some compatriots battle and overthrow the King of Persia and his army; then they battle and overthrow the Emperor of Turkey and his army; then they battle and overthrow the sultan of Egypt and his army.

Along the way there is a great deal of gratuitous violence graphically portrayed in blank verse. For example, after he bests the Turkish emperor Bajazeth, Tamburlaine imprisons him in a wheeled cage and drags the conquered one in shame behind his entourage. The Empress is made a slave of Tamburlaine's own concubine. The formerly royal couple is so depressed by this turn of fortune that they bash their brains out on the bars of the Emperor's cage. Later, with Tamburlaine and his men standing outside the walls of Damascus, the Egyptians' last stronghold, the Governor of Damascus sends out several virgins to plead for mercy. Tamburlaine orders the virgins slaughtered and their carcasses hung up on the city's walls.

What are we to make of such a butcher? A reading of the text suggests that Marlowe was fascinated by the very ruthlessness and determination of Tamburlaine. He is neither the chivalrous Knight of the romances nor is he the type of Machiavellian lion/fox that was to be such a compelling figure for Shakespeare. While still a shepherd Tamburlaine divulges his two primary motives. He "means to be a terror to the world" and create an empire "measured only by east and west." In his bed he wants Zenocrate, the Sultan of Egypt's daughter and everyone's ideal of pulchritude. In other words, he wants to turn the world upside down. In so doing he lays waste not only to every person in his path, but to every ideal and value that the Tudor culture held dear: order and degree, moderation, divine right of kingship, and so forth.

For Shakespeare, the rebel was always a source of cosmic disruption.

For Shakespeare, the rebel was always a source of cosmic disruption and calamity, and certainly not one to be promoted. In the play *Tamburlaine the Great,* Marlowe celebrates the rebel and not, it should be added, the romantic revolutionary fighting against social or moral injustice. Marlowe's brutal, pitiless rebel conquers the world for himself. This is, of course, one person's reading of the text.

In the American Players Theatre program, Mik Derks offers another reading of the text. In a "conventional production," Derks might be assumed to be the director of *Tamburlaine the Great.* Here he is listed first among four collaborating directors and also as author of the program notes. Derks points out that Tamburlaine was a historical figure well known to the Elizabethans, one ardently hated for his ruthless conquests and savage atrocities. And yet, Marlowe manages to make him the hero of his play without altering any of the historical facts. If the Elizabethans who watched Edward Alleyn enact the role some two hundred years after the tyrant's death were indeed well-acquainted with the historical Tamburlaine, they were much more fortunate than their modern American counterparts in Spring Green. Most of us simply had no frame of reference for this Asian brute. (I worried for the members of the audience who hadn't forked over the four dollars for the program.) Despite our lack of knowledge of the historical Tamburlaine, it was near impossible to regard him as a hero.

The modern audience's historical disadvantage redoubles the production director's responsibility for creating that frame of reference on stage. But, of course, *Tamburlaine* had no director, other than the text. But what exactly is the text? The record of a message sent by playwright to his audience which shared with him a generally common understanding of the world and its inhabitants. In the conventional production the director's function begins with a reading of the text—which, unable to speak for itself, must first be read. Having read his message, the director replaces the absent playwright as the sender of that message to his audience, with whom he shares understandings in common.

The director's art, based on his reading, is one of composition, of arranging elements on his stage canvas. The director focuses the audience's attention on the essential elements of the drama by emphasizing stage positions. It is an actor's responsibility to read the text for meaning and then clarify that meaning through the use of accents, pauses, and stresses, but the director listens, judges, and corrects the actor's work. The director assumes the double role of poet and audience. The director makes the art and then looks at it with the eye, ear, and

The show is more pageant than anything else.

mind of his audience. It is a terrible responsibility, fraught with potential for error and misjudgment, not one to be taken lightly.

On stage, *Tamburlaine the Great* was more a pageant than anything else. Troupe after troupe of brightly-costumed actors marched across the stage spouting martial verse in iambic pentameter, occasionally engaging each other in slow-motion battle pantomimes. One wondered how these warriors steeped in dusty, bloody combat could continue to look so fresh and newly garbed; it was as if Tamburlaine fought his wars on the way home from the haberdasher. This costumer's party is difficult if not impossible to sort out. Randall Duk Kim creates an interesting and sometimes compelling Tamburlaine. Kim is a small man and the irony of his victories over much larger men was not lost. His oriental features gave the character an appropriately exotic quality. And the APT's artistic director has a way with Marlowe's mighty line. The rest of the large cast of dramatis personae stirred themselves into a colorful stew. Hardly anyone was distinguishable as actor or character, and nearly everyone had a difficult time making the poetic magic that the program notes promised.

Without benefit of a director's shaping, the audience was left to make what it would of *Tamburlaine.* Had the production been less fancily dressed and the delivery of the lines less rhetorical, had the whole thing, in short, been more comprehensible, the audience might have shuddered at the celebration of this idiosyncratic, monomaniacal tyrant. Conscious of some well known twentieth-century brutes, the audience might have wondered why the American Players Theatre, which is committed to humanizing, integrating, and promoting the well being of the American community, has added this play to its repertoire.

Music

The Hazards Of Competitions

Keith Paulson-Thorp

Contemporary music seldom attracts more than a handful of talented performers. Those who enjoy its particular challenges and rewards, however, are not always able to find pieces that will satisfy their curiosities. What few pieces actually appear in published form will usually be out-of-print by the time most of us are aware of their presence. From the composer's point of view, it is difficult to achieve the recognition which would insure that these performers will have access to one's music, and thus be able to present to the public reasonable interpretations of our work.

With this in mind, it seemed to be fortunate indeed when an anonymous benefactor placed at the disposal of the Southeastern Historical Keyboard Society (SEHKS) the funds with which to promote new works for the harpsichord. The result of this generosity was the 1982 Alienor Competition. The competition is now history. The results of the competition were hardly what either the directors or the composers who entered works might have expected.

Keith Paulson-Thorp *teaches Music Theory and Composition at the University of Southwestern Louisiana. He writes frequently on the world of music for* The Cresset.

Contemporary music draws few talented performers.

Being a relatively new operation, the SEHKS made every attempt to run a professional competition. The Alienor received excellent advance publicity with announcements appearing in most major periodicals in the field. Awards, it was announced, would be made in two categories. The first would embrace works of more than fifteen minutes duration, the second works of less than eight minutes duration.

The prizes ranged in size from five hundred to four thousand dollars, making this one of the most attractive competitions for composers in recent years. Works submitted must have been written during the past several years, could not have received a public performance, and could not have received any other prize. The panel requested that a tape of each entry be submitted when possible.

Many of these requirements are standard fare in any competition. Certain points, however, raised a number of eyebrows. First, there was no category for works of between eight and fifteen minutes duration. A substantial amount of the contemporary repertoire, as well as much of the historical repertoire, falls into this category. Any of the Bach French Suites would have been ineligible in such a competition as would many substantial works of this century, such as the sonatas of Martinu or Persichetti.

Second, if the work were new and unperformed, the composer would not have had the opportunity to review and revise his work or to evaluate its public appeal. If the purpose of the competition was to add significant new works to the repertoire, that goal was thus impeded. Third, if the work were unperformed, where might the tape come from? Harpsichordists who are willing to learn difficult new works, and to learn them just for the sake of making a tape, are not exactly stand-

The most successful and revered harpsichord works of the last two decades have drawn blatantly upon baroque prototypes and might therefore be called "pseudo-baroque."

ing on every street corner. That the rules of the competition required serious overhauling became painfully evident to the directors only after the judging had begun.

If there were qualms about the competition before it commenced, even greater problems came to light after the decisions had been announced. The stated purpose of the competition was to stimulate the creation of a significant new repertoire for the harpsichord and to foster interest among composers in the unique tonal properties of the instrument. This would seem to imply that little or no repertoire from our century existed at the time the competition was announced. What was actually being declared was that the existing repertoire was not idiomatic to the instruments currently in vogue.

Since the mid-Sixties, the heavier, less responsive, factory-built instruments have gradually been replaced by instruments designed in accordance with prototypes from the eighteenth century. These historically-based instruments are more brilliant in tone but less versatile in the matter of changing registrations during performance. Many performers, however, feel that the differences between the instruments are largely cosmetic and that they do not actually affect the basic musical properties of the instrument; the musical merits of the existing literature would then outweigh the logistical problems of adapting it to a slightly different instrument. This group has given credence to its case by performing this repertoire on historically-based instruments both in concert and on recordings.

The assertion of seeking to create a "new" repertoire is further ambiguous with respect to style preference. Of the myriad styles currently practiced in music composition, which one should be used as the basis for the new repertoire? If stylistic choice is thus limited, are the competing styles then inappropriate? Should music which deliberately avoids obvious stylistic connections with the past be avoided or encouraged? And what of works which are modelled after the great works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? A return to the solidity of structural principles of the past has certainly been a hallmark of the stylistic retrenchment found in the music of many important living composers.

A return to the solidity of structural principles of the past has been a hallmark of the stylistic retrenchment found in the music of many important living composers.

At the preliminary judging the category for works of more than fifteen minutes was eliminated. The prize monies from that category were to be used for the commissioning of new works by established composers. Adding insult to injury, the judges issued a statement to the effect that the entries submitted were generally unidiomatic, that the composers were obviously not familiar with the current instrument and its characteristics, and that composers should develop a "truly modern" idiom for solo harpsichord rather than a "pseudo-baroque" idiom.

If such comments had the intention of establishing a stylistic norm for modern music, they were not likely to succeed with such nebulous terminology. The proliferation of compositional techniques generated in the past half-century prohibits the classification of one group of techniques as distinctly more "modern" than another. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to construct a harpsichord work that does not relate in some very obvious way to its baroque predecessors.

During the three hundred years when the harpsichord was at its zenith of popularity, composers explored an exhaustive compendium of idiomatic devices. Most of these devices were applicable to a wide variety of stylistic contexts and continue to be applicable to the styles in use today. Any attempt at creating a new repertoire of "idiomatic" techniques will only display the artist's lack of contact with the past; he will be repeating history.

Only the assaults on the interior of the instruments, explored in the Sixties and Seventies, have yielded a new body of sonic materials. These effects, however, tend to draw attention to themselves as novelties rather than to their functions as building blocks in a musical structure. Many of these extended techniques even damage the instrument on which they are executed.

The most successful and revered harpsichord works of the last two decades have drawn blatantly upon baroque prototypes and might therefore be called "pseudo-baroque." A consistently high level of activity, the use of overlapping hands, and a profusion of ornamental filigree are common both in baroque works for the instrument and in contemporary works. Again, the use of these idiomatic techniques does not specify one particular style over another. Consistency of a style within a composition and the ingenuity of design (as evidenced by timing of events, clarity of goals and movements, etc.) will generally attract a receptive audience.

If the judges failed to expound a foundation for their stylistic biases, they were no less suspect in their claim that composers did not understand the idiomatic qualities of the instrument. Most composers, if they wish to write for harpsichord, are able to gain access to an instrument and to distinguish for themselves which techniques work most successfully. Several of the composers whose works were entered are themselves harpsichordists. Their opin-

The hope of writing a work whose quality will make it a worthwhile addition to the repertoire is not as important as the hope of adding a new laurel to one's resume.

ions with regard to the idiomatic nature of the instrument are surely as valid as those held by the judges.

In view of these considerable problems, it is surprising that one might nonetheless be able to assert that the Alienor competition was actually a success. Of the scores of pieces submitted from across the United States and from several foreign countries, five were selected to receive awards. Of these five, four are truly extraordinary works and deserve the wider exposure they may be given as a result of the competition.

Without resorting to special effects, these composers have addressed the challenge of writing for harpsichord, an instrument which compels the composer to deal with music on the most abstract level (i.e., as a succession of frequencies and durations devoid of dynamic nuance), and have constructed works which develop interesting ideas in a cogent format. One of the more interesting features of these works is the imagination with which composers have reintroduced large areas of harmonic consonance into their compositional language. If the Alienor competition has made us aware that a considerable number of works from our time exists and deserves to be heard, it has achieved a very worthwhile goal.

What I find myself asking, however, is how many fine works were discarded during the judging process because they failed to appeal to the judges' stylistic tastes or to the judges' sense of what is or is not idiomatic to the instrument. If so many composers are working in so many different styles and the judges have selected only a handful to be given public recognition, are we not being cheated? Is there not a method by which the Alienor monies could be channelled into providing the kind of exposure that would allow harpsichordists to experience the modern repertoire and still make their own decisions regarding which styles and composers they may wish to incorporate into programs?

The directors of the competition now face the difficult task of evaluating the competition. Options include serious restructuring as well as the possibility of eliminating the competition in favor of alternate means of stimulating compositional productivity. The very concept of a competition to achieve the goals outlined by the committee presents obstacles.

For decades, it has become increasingly impossible for composers of concert music (as opposed to music for film, theatre, popular entertainment, etc.) to make a living outside of the university community. All but a few of us find the activities of teaching and performance to be as much a part of our lives as the activity of composition. Criteria for survival within academia, however, hinge on the completion of a terminal degree, successful academic experience, and recognition in the field as supported by publications and citations from important competitions.

Since it is difficult to find publishers for most new music, the circulation revenues from which cannot begin to cover publishing costs, most aspiring composers lunge full throttle into the competition circuit. The hope of writing a work the quality of which will make it a worthwhile addition to the repertoire is not as important as the hope of adding a new laurel to one's resume. If the Alienor was a stimulant in the production of new scores, it is unlikely that the composers who produced these scores did so for other than purely personal reasons. Established composers, the ones who should be most encouraged to write for harpsichord, are not generally

talkin' purgatorio blues

like any blue lined themebook page
stripped from its comfortably spiralling steel
my brain is grasped by the pads of slender fingers
and ripped from these pot luck societies
to the tune of a mene mene tekel upharsin;
but I am scrap on which God just scribbles
with an index finger
that slices through the blue veins of my temple . . .
he crumples me in his holy right fist
and hook shoots me into his executive waste basket
O God I am not whining
but why write on my walls?

(here am I Lord) jagged and stained
crinkled and junked
but learning to psalm from this black tin
though cigarette filters sponge my eyeballs dry
and brown stained styrofoam is coffeed to my red hair—
blessed am I as I await transfer
into some isolated dumpster
along any back alley of gold (soli deo)
gloria gloria uh men.

Bill Stadick

If competitions encourage the work of young artists, they also discourage those who cannot compete.

in need of further awards and in fact do not seem to have taken a noticeable interest in the competition.

There is no dearth of forums for budding composers. Competitions are annually sponsored by the Bates Foundation, Broadcast Music, Inc., and the National Association of Composers, among others. The aims of these competitions are to promote the careers of talented young composers. It is not likely that the results will be earth shattering. The Alienor competition obviously cannot succeed as a composers' competition if its goals are to augment the modern repertoire with quality works.

Competitions serve a secondary purpose as well. If they encourage the work of young artists, they also discourage those who are not capable of delivering the goods. Competitions weed out the starry-eyed who are short on either talent or dedication, and help, if only in a nominal way, to protect the standards of the profession.

Yet the annals of music history are replete with cases where talented folk managed to assert their genius in spite of disappointments on the competition circuit. Ravel, for instance, never achieved the Prix de Rome, in spite of frequent attempts. Bizet, who did achieve the Prix de Rome in 1858, was not awarded the Rodrigues Prize the following year. His entry, the A Major *Te Deum,* was to be his last sacred work.

It is this type of reaction that causes us to take pause. By rejecting the works of many talented composers and by pontificating on matters of style, it is possible that the Alienor committee is sending the wrong signals to composers. If a composer feels that his work is inferior because it has not placed in a competition, or if he is told that the style in which he writes is not suitable to the harpsichord, he will doubtless not write for the instrument again. It is unfortunate that in a contest there must be both winners and losers. We must not lose sight of the fact that the losers might yet be able to contribute significant works to the repertoire, but that they will not feel inclined to try if their music is rejected out of hand.

For this reason, it is imperative that the Alienor committee consider alternatives. The commissioning of works from established composers is a viable alternative. Several major names are being considered, including Crumb, Lutoslawski, Albright, and Takemitsu. Yet, if composers must all wait until they are well known to begin writing for the harpsichord, how will they improve their technique?

In place of a competition, a forum for new harpsichord music might be a regular part of the annual conclave of the SEHKS. Here composers and performers might exchange ideas about their crafts. The composers whose works show the most promise might then be commissioned to write a new work for the instrument which would provide fuel for the following year's forum. This approach has the advantage of bringing before the public a larger number of works and of encouraging the exchange of ideas necessary for the healthy evolution of musical art.

Competitions may remain a part of a composer's initiation rite, but the Alienor funds should not be channelled in this direction. The administrative headaches and phobic reticence on the part of composers do not make competitions the ideal method for enhancing the harpsichord repertoire. A more productive environment for artistic exchange can bring together the heterogenous currents of contemporary composition and focus all of these on the central problem of writing for the harpsichord. Then we will have found a way to truly enrich this already fertile repertoire.

The Nation



Leaving Home

Gail McGrew Eifrig

We in America need ceremonies, is I suppose, sailor, the point of what I have written. John Updike

This isn't a column about Updike, but his sentence about America's need for ceremonies to mark our important passages calls for some attention. The line is the final one in a collection of early stories by America's present-day Hawthorne, and because his voice is so American, those of us who care about our national definition, or identity, may turn to him now and again for some insights about ourselves as a nation. Updike here seems to propose his stories themselves as a kind of ceremony, a formalized occasion for communal recognition, a locale for enactment or re-enactment of an experience that is past, or passing, but still powerful.

Though most of his characters are clearly individuals, realized quite completely, with all their uniquely recognizable but surprising failures and successes drawn out in startling prose (imaginary suburbs with real husbands in them, if I may be permitted an obscure literary in-joke), his protagonists are relevant to us as a group, to modern culture, to modern American culture. Updike's stories seem to demand that we read them aware of ourselves as members of a group. And when I read Updike as an American I am most of all con-

scious of an extraordinary emphasis on home. Something in the American psyche wrestles that theme insistently, refusing to let the angel go until a blessing is given. Is it true that for Americans, going home is more important and more impossible than for others?

While I'm writing this, we've just sent James Watt home from Washington. That's a disgrace, and even the Western gimmickry of an announcement from horseback couldn't disguise it. Sent home. It's different of course to go home, which is what all American writers try to do and find they can't. Again. There's "run along home," another phrase Updike uses, echoing from all our childhoods, a promise of reception with an implied message that there's somewhere to be sent from.

Home is where the heart is, on the range perhaps, or down home, an expression so stubbornly American that only John Denver or Jim Croce could explain it to a German or a Japanese. To those of us who read lots of Robert Frost, home is the place where when you have to go there, they have to take you in, or alternatively, something you somehow haven't to deserve.

We aren't always certain that we mean a compliment when we talk about home. It is interesting that the British prime minister conducts business from an address, but the American president has a house. That implies that though his may be bigger and whiter than ours, it isn't any better, or any more privileged. It's a wonderfully homely thing to call the headquarters of such a powerful figure, and he works there too, like the fellow who sells insurance from the back bedroom, done over with office furniture from Sears. In this way, we have domesticated at least a portion of the government, and we thereby keep it in its place.

Generally, when we refer to home we mean that something is better, like home cooking, or homemade pie. But made by loving hands at home is not a compliment; it means that something bought with money would be better, but you'll make do. We seem to be ambivalent about home even at this prosaic level. We do praise home cooking, but we're a nation that eats out more than one meal in four.

Of course there is coming home, a ceremony participated in by many middle-class Americans in the fall of the year, a ritual that marks quite profoundly just how ambiguous we are about the whole business of home. Homecomings are officially celebrated not at anybody's home, but at college, places no one (except a few tweedy types who teach) ever calls home. In a way, the message that a college homecoming sends is absolutely that you can't go home again. Never at any other time is one confronted more dramatically with inexorable change in oneself and in those with whom one shared pieces of the past. To quote Updike again, this time talking about his desire to write about his grandmother:

> It seemed incumbent upon me, necessary and holy, to tell how once there had been a woman who now was no more, how she had been born and lived in a world that had ceased to exist, though its mementoes were all about us. . . .

Though its mementoes may be all about us, home always means the past, and the past is irrecoverable. Homecoming, a time to visit a place that is not—was never—a home, soon gives way to the next season. When a friend asks you if you are going home for the holidays, she certainly does not mean the place you actually live, the place you pay rent for or water the plants in. We imply, when we ask each other that question, really large questions about ourselves and our relations to the past.

Some Americans never leave home. But for the majority, home is a place you have left; we are so mobile that we are never surprised to be asked, "Where is your home?" even when we are standing in it. To be from somewhere else is a supremely American quality. And this great national homesickness certainly is a part of Updike's view of us as a people. The point of what he has written, at least in those exquisitely painful and beautiful early stories, seems to be that we recognize more clearly the moment of our leaving home. Knowing our past is important, because we balance on a little rim of present between what was and what will be.

But it would be a pity for us as a people, as it would be for any individual, not to leave home. It would be a pity for us to allow ourselves to be haunted by a nostalgia for some past home—our cozy, nineteenth-century self-righteous isolation, for example—and to be unaware that we had left that home for a new place. We need ceremonies to mark for us the fact that we have left home. That is what adults do, after all.

The Last Word



In Whose Eye?

Dot Nuechterlein

True confessions time: I am not a painted lady.

You probably have no idea how traumatic it is for a modern middle-class woman to make that statement. For if there is anything that separates one from the rest of the species, the failure to wear make-up just might be it. In fact, offhand I cannot think of anyone of roughly my background and station in life over the age of about thirteen who faces the world as unadorned as I.

Once, when I resisted her high-powered sales pitch, a department store cosmetician sneered at me: "My dear, *no one* goes around with a naked face!"

Except me. Here is my so-called "beauty" routine:

Always: moisturizer.
Usually: lipstick.
Often: mascara.
Regularly: cologne.
Occasionally: nail polish.
Never: powder, pancake, foundation, blusher, slicker, toner, rouge, astringent, cleansing cream, hormone cream, concealer, highlighter, wrinkle cream, beauty grains, vanishing cream, mud pack, cuticle cream, eyeliner, eyeshadow, eyebrow pencil, brow tweezers, false lashes, lash curlers.

The list goes on. As you can see, my cupboard is practically bare, and the billion-dollar cosmetics industry would shudder at such heresy.

Now there are only two questions which might be worth asking about this state of affairs: (1) How come? and (2) So what?

As to the first, I am a sociologist, one who believes in the concept of socialization. Somewhere back in late childhood/early adolescence the message that girls were supposed to pretty up their faces simply didn't sink in. My mother and all my other role models—friends, favorite relatives, movie stars, etc.—wore make-up, so the social lack was my fault, not theirs.

The only thing about me that I can remember being different from most other kids was that I didn't have acne. My children find this hard to believe, but I wasn't plagued at all with what they call "zits." And that plus naturally embarrassingly rosy cheeks became part of my identity. Maybe if I had been voted something glamorous like Miss Personality or Miss Most Likely To Succeed instead of the prosaic Miss Complexion of Tell City High School for four years in a row, things might have been different.

Anyway, it always looked to me like cosmetics were plenty of time-consuming bother. Expensive, too. So somehow I just never got into the habit. Later in life I was active in theater groups and became quite proficient at applying the stuff, but it was too late to translate that into the daily routine.

Well, maybe not. Now that old age is creeping up it may be a good idea to camouflage the ravages of time like everyone else does. Which leads us to point two.

There is no doubt but what mature skin loses vitality, elasticity, and color, while gaining creases and lines that appear unbidden. I have no quarrel with women using every bit of ammunition available to improve upon nature, and when artfully made up, many look absolutely smashing.

My primary concern, however, is that this process begins so early, long before there is any intrinsic necessity. For the past decade I have been hanging around college campuses, and let me tell you, the "natural look" is no more. The trend is clearly toward more and more face-glop, and lots of lovely skin never sees the light of day. (When I taught at eight a.m. I learned that some young women would rather skip class or die than arrive sans beauty ritual.)

Why do they do it? Obviously because they think it makes them more attractive. But where do we get our sense of beauty? Not from within, of course, but from the image reflected back to us by others.

We know that from Cleopatra onward, most cultures have espoused facial and bodily decoration, changing styles notwithstanding. Yet seldom has the use of cosmetics been as pervasive throughout all age levels as in our society. While I am not anti-business, nor do I object to selling products through the use of advertisements, it seems likely to me that today's ultra-hard sell aimed at females has set our standards for us. And that troubles me.

One thing I would like to know is whether this view of beauty apparently common among women today, namely, an all-out dependence on cosmetics, is the same one held by men. We like to say we are pleasing ourselves by the way we dress and look and act, but probably most of the time most of us want to please them, too.

Only we have gotten so sensitive about being regarded as mere physical objects that many men have learned to shut up about our appearance altogether. So if the girl with purplish cheeks and greenish eye sockets and whitish lips is less an appealing sight than simply a sight, who is going to tell her? And should someone dare, would she be apt to care?